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CHAPTER I 
INTRO DUCTION 
.\ 
Relations between Mexico and "W1'~ United States were 
/ 
quite satisfactory during the major part of the Diaz regime. 
Porfirio Diaz was in pOVler from 1876 until 1910. He had been 
elected on a platfo~l advocating non-~eelection, so in 1880 
/ his friend, General Gonzalez, "('las placed in office and ruled 
/ 
for a term, after which Diaz returned to the presidency and 
there remained for twenty-six years. His chief objective 
waS to make Mexico a prosperous nation. He aimed to increase 
industrial and commercial profits. In follovdng this program 
he sVTept aside what, to him, were irrelevant matters. He 
ignored social, spiritual and cultural problems of which there 
was an abundance. The industrialization and comm,ercial expatf-
sion of the nation he effected; but it waS of little benefit 
to the masses. 
" Diaz followed the principle of expediency, that tithe end 
justifies the means." He accomplished many things 'which 
'were beneficial to the nation. l Peace waS established in 
Mexico. But peace was not wi thout its price. Opposition 
1 For a brief statement of these see W. S. Robertson, History 
of the Latin American Nations, D. Appleton, New York, 1943, 
7;65-466. 
1 
2 
newspapers vrere suppressed. One of his policies for '!3tifling 
opposi tion "was that of playing his supporters off against one 
another before they could develope suffic'ient strength to 
oppose him. n2 Material prosperity waS greatly increased. In 
1893, n1az appointed Jos~Ives Limt~tour, a French creole, 
Secretary of the Treasury. Most of the financial reforms 
/ 
which were initiated under the niaz'Iegime can be credited to 
Limantour. The latter e'stablished the monetary system on a 
gold basis. He also abolished the hated alcabala, a sales tax 
inherited from Spanish times. Another of his accomplishments 
was consolidation of the railway system.3 Railroads and 
telegraph lines were greatly expanded. In 1876 there had 
been 691 kilometers of railroad; by 1911 there were 24,717 
kilometers.4 Imports and exports were increased. They were 
valued at 51,760,000 pesos in 1873; by 1910 it was 87,916,000 
pesos.5 The national income was increased from $19,776,638 
to nearly $100,000,000 by the end of the niaz regime~6 In 
/ 
order to achieve this commercial expansion, Diaz pavmed his 
country~s resources to foreign capitalists. 
-~---..... ---6 
2 Herbert Ingram Priestley, The Mexican Nation, ! Histo:ry" 
Macmillan Company, New YorK,""1923, 380. 
3 Ibid., 383. 
4 ma.; 391. 
"" 
~ I'OI<I., 391. 
o Erne'st Gruening, Mexico ~ Its Heritage, Century Company, 
New Yorlt, 1928, 561 .. 
3 
In 1884 he sponsor~d a mining code which decreed·that the 
surface proprietor ?ms entitled to subsoil rights. Foreign 
investors eagerly seized this opportunity to exploit Mexico 1 s 
vast mineral resources. Unfortunately this process tended to 
,. "7 
increase the concentration of land into the hands of a few and 
to increase the material poverty of the larger part of the 
people. Any discontent on their par\ vmS smothered by the 
capable hands of the local officials and police. 
Foreigners benefited greatly under the administration of 
I 
Diaz. Not only were they offered lucrative economic oppor-
tunity, but they vrere given security, protection and preced-
ence in local dealings. Americans were not the only ones to 
benefit by these favors; but the bulk of the investors were 
Americans. "Nor were the concessions generally such as would 
yield returns without expense, effort or ingenuity.,,7 By 1913 
...... 
about 75,000 Americans were living in Mexico as miners, 
engineers, merchants and agriculturalists. American invest-
ments totaled about $1,500,000,000 -- a sum larger than that 0 
other foreigners combined. 8 Americans oWned 78% of the mines, 
72% of the smelters, 58% of the oil, and 68% of the rubber-
.' . 
7 J. Fred Rippy, The United states and Mexico, Alfred A. 
8 Knopf', New York-;-I926, 311, 312. - . . 
House Doc. No. 305,' 57 Congo 2 sess., I, 5030 Fall 
CommIttee Report II, 3322. 
business of Mexico. 9 American investments in mining vrere 
. . 
valued at $95,000,000, investments in agriculture at 
$28,000,000 and in manufacturing at $10,000,000.10 The total 
investments of Mexicans were valued at $792,187,242.11 
Foreigners looked upon Diaz vr.t~K approval. Elihu Root, 
Theodore Roosevelt t s Secretary of State had said: "I look on 
I 
Porfirio Diaz, the President of Mexicf' as one of the great 
men to hold up for the ·worship of mankind. n12 
I 
However, after the turn of the century, Diaz began to 
/ 
meet ,'n. th increasing criticism in Mexico. Diaz could stop 
this but he could not stop the encroachment of age. It waS 
not the masses, so long pressed down, that began to foment the 
opposi tion but the landed educated Mexicans vlho felt that they 
were being tr sold out" to foreign interests. Various organs 
of the press conducted anti-Yankee campaigns. These included 
Correo de Espanol, ~ Nacionai, !! Tiempo, ~ Patria, 
I I 
El Debate, !1 Pais, and El Diario del Hogar. 13 Diaz soon 
clamped a censorship on these papers.14 
President Taft, 1909, v~ote to his Wife: 
---------r 
9 Ibid., 3322. 
10 James Morton Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexico, 
Macmillan Company, New York, 1932, 511. --
11 Congressional Record, 63 Cong., 1st sess., 2232. 
12 Robert Bacon and James Scott, Latin America and the United 
13 States, Harvard Press, Cambridge, Mass., 19l~lOS: 
Rippy, 323. 
14 Ibid., 324 •. 
-
It is inevitable, that in case .' 
of a revdlution or internecine strife, 
we should interfere and I s.,incerely 
hope that the old man's [Dia~ offi-
cial life will extend beyond mine, 
for that trouble vrould present a 15 
problem of the utmost difficulty. 
It waS during the Taft years that A1ne7rican capital was seeking 
foreign outlets. Dollar diplomacy was in vogue. Mexico pro-
vided an outlet for surplus capital af v.rell as a market for 
American manufacturers. Taft's fears of a revolution vrere to 
be jus tified t'lNO years later. 
I 
In March, 1908, Diaz in an interview 'with J'ames Creelman 
of Pearson's Magazine, stated: 
••• he vvould welcome the forma-
tion of a political party which 
should put forward an opposition 
candidate; that he v~uld surrender 
the power to such6a candidate if legally elected. l . 
This announcement precipitated a storm of political activity'''''' 
in the form of opposition parties. In the fall of 1908, a 
pamphlet entitled The Presidential Succession of 1910 waS 
published by Francisco I. Madero. It embodied a political 
reform program, one point of which stressed no reelections 
I 
for the presidency. The author, Madero, 'was a member of the 
.' . 
privileged classes. His family ovmed large tracts of land and 
5 
15 Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, 
6 Farrar and Rinehart,New-yorlc," 1939, II, 700. -
1 Priestley, 396. 
held vast mining and banking interests. As his book eecame 
. 
increasingly popular, he was hailed as the leader of the 
opposition. 
6 
The follovdng April, 1909, Madero and Francisco v~squez 
G6mez were nominated for' president'·aRd vice-president by the 
anti-reelectionist party. The anti-reelectionist party planned 
to restore the Constitution, grant frfedom of the press, create 
elective suffrage and stimulate education. As the time for 
elections drew near, "the old Chief had let it be lmown that 
he would again respond to pressure and go through the form of 
another election in spite of the Creelman interview."l? I Diaz 
suppressed the party meetings and on July 6, 1910, Madero was 
jailed on the charge of plotting a rebellion. 
On October 4, 1910, the government declared Diaz reelecte 
But it waS clear to many that age had caused him to lose his 
grip on public affairs. 18 Three days later, Madero, by this 
time free on bail, jumped his bond, disguised himself as a 
workman, and crossed the border into the United states. He 
declared the recent elections null and void and began revolu-
I 
tionary pJ.ans. He issued his plan of San Luis potosi,19 
restating his program and announcing his provisional presi-, 
17 V~lfrid Callcott; Liberalism In Mexico 1857-1929, stanford 
18 University Press, 1931, 171. -- ---- ----
Robertson, 467. 
19 Priestley, 398. 
dency. He set November 20th as the date for the rebel1ion. 
V~en he recrossed the border, only a small band of armed men 
joined him; since this was insufficient he returned to San 
Antonio. A few days later, Francisc? Villa, a Mexican bandit 
.• "7 
defeated state troops in Chihuahua. Villa declared himself a 
leader of the Madero revolution. Madero reentered Mexico, 
joined the ".A:rmy of the North" and t~ revolution gained 
momentum. 
" On the 9th of May, 1911, Ciudad Juarez was taken and this 
marked an important victory. Eniliano Zapata, the leader of 
the peons in the south, took Morelos. Federal troops met 
I 
everyvlhere with increasing resistance. May 21, Diaz Signed a 
treaty in which he agreed to resign.20 On May 25 his resigna-
tion was given. Francisco de La Barra, foreign minister, be-
came interim President. His cabinet was a coalition one, con~ 
"", 
taining some Maderistas. He vms pledged to hold elections. 
In October, elections were held and Madero was elected 
President. Taft immediately recognized his government. 
7 
Mexico vras in need of many reforms, political, economic, and 
social. The many malcontents, ,~o had supported Madero, 
expected him to carry out their various programs. Madero', how-
ever, was not primarily a man of action. Priestley states, 
20 lli..£., 401. 
8 
"The executive authority for which he was temperament~lly 
unadapted was destroying to his nerves. n21 He waS unable to 
please the diverse groups which supported him. The atmosphere 
VIas full of criticism. The newspapers urged rebellion. 22 
,;P "7 
Military leaders conspired against the government: 
The successes of the revolu-
tion had aroused all the military 
ambition put under an.anaesthetic 
by the vigor of Dfaz. NO"l, however, 
all wanted vnth share of the spoils. 23 
Revolutionists in the south were discontented because no 
immediate land restoration was made. Madero had promised the 
peasants land and this he 'waS not able to deliver. It "would 
take time to create a land commission and more time for the 
commission to ,rork out an acceptable plan.24 Madero had also 
stressed the need of improving educational facilities; but 
there were few teachers to be found. The foreign element was 
,." 
discontented because it was no longer granted concessions with 
/ 
the free hand that characterized the Diaz regime. The 
I 
cientificos and wealthy classes who had benefited by Diaz 
favori tism were discontent. Many who had joined Madero for 
mercena~ reasons vrere disappointed at his idealistic admin-
istration~ Extreme reformers felt that Madero was being" too 
21 Ibid.; 405. 
22 mer., 408. 
23 ~cott, 201. 
24 Francis Clement Kelley, Blood-Drenched Altars, ~ce 
Publishing Company, Milwaukee, 1935, 217. 
conciliatory to Dartisc ..:ns of 
"- . 
/ 
Diaz. They y,rishecl him tcf" adrrrin-
ister t justice t to the supporters of D(az. 25 ECldero could 
s;ctisfy no one. TI All he had \'!~S a sound theory of goverrr::lent, 
aS judged by the constitution, ·,'lhicb., as "\72.S plain, 1,Iexico ','ms 
not yet re,:dy to use.!l26 
LIadero vms not a tyrnnt; he nttem.:9tecl to give the peo})le 
e)OI:locratic rule. 27 ifhis me.do it e2,si;r for the opposition to 
organize \."i thout inte:d'erence. 1111e ne\'Ispa:9 ers, 8i ven freedom 
fro:cl censorship, Tlrococo.cd to ['..ttack r.Int1ero. 28 As a result, 
LIadero attempted to introduce Q bill to the Chanber of 
Deputies '."Thich ',iDuld curtail freedom of the :9ress. SUch a 
')9 furor tIaS aroHsecl. that tile bill '(las 1.';i thdraUll. (-
In --'GlIe south, the agr3.rlCl,l1S of Zayata, inpatient for 
land reforms, too:: action for themselves. In the north, 
Orozco, I'rho had been one of Madero t S military leaders in the 
rev'olution, led 3. rebellion for la111 0";::nors. I~e accused 
/ 
l1c'..c1oro of failing to CD.rry out the I)lr'n of San Luis Potosi .3 0 
I'riestley nentions that :fLeG.o.ers of the rnvoJ_ution such as 
Orozco felt snubbed in the w:ltter of 8.p)ointNents ."31LIexico 
needed Y.1al}y refor:ns but Lie.dero ilad not the strength of 
2'"' 
"J 2b 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
Ro bert son , 1~67. 
Kelley, 219. 
Callcott, 2011--. 
Gruening, 95. 
Callcott, 202. 
Ibid., 206. 
Priestley, 406. 
9 
10 
character necessary to impose these reforms. Rebellicm.s in 
. 
both the north and the south continued to harass the amninis-
tration. 32 
On February 9, 1913, General Bernardo Reyes attempted a 
coup d t etat which '!vas thwarted by· etu~tavo Mad.ero, brother of 
the President, and Reyes met his death. tTTen bloody days 
followed; the capital city 'waS bomba~ded by revolutionists; 
thousands of innocent people were slaughtered in the streets."3 
NoV! the leadership of the rebellious forces fell to Felix 
I / 
Diaz, nephew of the former dictator. ~Vhile the Diaz forces 
sVlelled, General Victoriano Huerta was placed in charge of the 
I palace guard. This was done by Garcia Pena, Minister·of War, 
"rather against the vn.sh of Madero who had no great confidence 
in the man. n34 Huerta, on the morning of the eleventh, made 
~ 
a pact vn. th Felix Diaz and arranged. for the overthrow of the 
.~ 
Madero government. 35 They informed the United states Ambassa-
dor, Henry Lane Wilson, of their intentions. Then came the 
ten bloody days of revolution. February 17, 1913, Wilson 
wired the state Department: "Huerta notifies me to expect 
some acti~m that will remove Madero from povtTer at any 
32 Ibid., 407. 
33 ~nt 4690 
34 Priestley, 411. 
35 ~., 1,,12. 
moment.n36 .' 
, The follmving day', February 18, Huerta seized the 
government. During the day, Gustavo Madero was arrested and 
~ 
killed; in the evening, Huerta and Felix Diaz met at the 
. , ),. "7 
American embassy and drew up plans for the government to be 
11 
headed by Huerta. Ambassador Wilson vJired Washington advising 
President Taft to recognize the Huer\a government. The Taft 
government was somewhat wary of the Ambassador's part in the 
proceedings as is evidenced by the message sent from Secretary 
of State Knox to Henry Lane Wilson on February 20, "General 
Huerta's consulting you as to the treatment of Madero, tends 
to give you a certain responsibility in the matter."37 
Madero's removal waS hardly distasteful to Ambassador Wilson 
and the foreign capitalists residing in Mexico. The civil 
strife and ensuing results had been a matter of great concer~ 
to the entire Diplomatic Corps.38 Madero's inability to con-
trol rebellious movements, some of which were anti-lmleric an , 
prevented,him from granting the security and protection the 
foreigners had previously enjoyed.39 Furthermore, industrial 
---------, 
36 Papers· Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United' 
states, GOvernment Printing Office, Washington; n.C., 1913, 
8120. (Hereafter this work ¥all be referred to as ForeiSA 
Relations.) 
3~ Ibid., 1913, 8121. 
59 l?+,Ie,st1ey, 414~ !lli:.., 407. 
operations were serious~y hampered by the civil disor~rs 
which were taking place. United States capital had employed 
1,800,000 Mexicans in 1910. In 1913, 500,000 Mexicans 
formerly hired by United states capital were unemployed. 40 
, . 
12 
"Of the 40,000 Alllericans, ••• discro~ed as permanent residents, 
possibly 20,000 were in Mexico at the beginning of March, 
1913."41 The foreign colony looked tf Huerta to reestablish 
order. 
Madero's place was taken by a very different type of man. 
Huerta waS decisive, a m~n of action. His background was very 
different from that of Madero. Huerta was born of Aztec 
parentage at Colotl~, Ja1isco in 1854.42 He was discovered in 
his native tovm by a General who needed someone for secretarial 
I 
vrork. Huerta came to the attention of Diaz and through his 
influence e'ntered the National Military School from which he 
.;rib 
graduated in 1891. At one time he headed the Geodetic SUrvey 
and at another time was Inspector of the National Railvreys.43 
He was made a Brigadier General in 1896. His decisive victory 
over the Orozco forces, who rebelled agai'nst Madero, vron him 
military ~cclaim. He was a Porfirista and knew no other than 
.... 
40 Callcott, 220. 
41 Edward I. Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico, MCBride, Nast 
42 and Company, NewTork, 1913, 340. --
4 Ro bertson, 470 • .. . . . . . . . . 3 Edith OfShaunessy, A DiE10matts Wife in Mexico, Harper and 
Brothers, New York,-191 ,122. ------
porfirian methods in su~pressing all opposi tion. 44 H<1i.'lever, 
he was to meet with his strongest opposition in a man beyond 
his realm, beyond his power of suppression. This man was 
Woodrow Wilson. 
, • • Y 
13 
The situation was well described by Edvfard Bell, who was 
in Mexico at the time: 
TvJO strong and refourcei'ul 
men had taken the higHest seats 
in two countries -- strong in 
different ways, contrasted rather 
than similar in acumen, vrldely un-
like in experience, and as far 
apart as possible in their 
morality. 45 
Thomas Woodrow Wilson was a scholarly, unmilitaristic 
man. Idealistic theories rather than hard realities governed 
his actions. He was born, the son of a minister, at Staunton, 
Virginia in 1856. He studied and practioed law but soon gave 
it up to become a professor of history at Bryn Mawr. In 1902"', 
Wilson became President of Princeton University. He was 
elected Governor of New Jersey in 1910. 
President of the United States. 
In 1913 he became 
His waS the first Democratic administration in 16 years. 
# 
It was up to him, an amateur in politics, to interpret the 
... 
foreign policy of the party to the world at large. His slight 
experience in politics had been confined to domestic and local 
44 Bel::j., 211. 
45 ~., 338. 
14 
issues. He 'was a man '~th fixed ideas and, as 'will be' shown 
later, refused to avail himself of the opinions of authorities. 
Only three of the ten men in his cabinet were experienced 
in the vJOrk they were to perform. William Jennings Bryan was 
· 
made Secretary of State as a gestu~e~to the large faction of 
the party vlhich he controlled. According to the historian, 
John Spencer Bassett: 
The Secretary of State was 
very weak in international law 
and he never showed that he grasped 
the foreign situation; but he brought 
the president a powerful political 
support at a time when it was needed. 46 
Henry Stoddard, the Washington journalist, "vrites: 
It is a mercy to Bryan to 
say little of his career as 
Secretary of State. 
That Wilson tolerated him 
so long is the best tribute I 
know to Wilson's self-control and 
patience. Of course, Bryan in 
the cabinet was politics, but47 even politics has its limits. 
Bryan was decidedly no asset to Wilson in conducting foreign 
affairs. But Bryan waS not responsible for the foreign I 
policy of the Wilson administration. R~y Stannard Baker, 
I 
friend and biographer of the president, states that: 
46 John Spencer Bassett, A Short History of the United States, 
Macmillan Company, NeviYork, 1938, 854':'g5,. 
47 Henry L. Stoddard, As I Knew Them, Presidents and Politics 
from Grant ~ Coolinge; Harper-and BrOthers, ~ork, 
~, 284. 
••• it was difficult for him .' 
(Wilson] to delegate authority, 
especially in matters vvhich pro-
foundly engaged his interest or 
aVlakened his emotions; and he 
suffered in foreign affairs 
especiallY by the weakness of 
those upon whom a Pr.esident should 
have depended 1.'71. th c"onfidence. 
The devotion, the loyalty and the 
ideals of Bryan were beyond doubt; 
but the fact remained that Wilson 
never allovred any thread of the 
complicated Mexican si~uation to 
escape his Ovvn attention.48 
Evidently the Mexican policy of the Vtllson administration 
was directly that of Woodrow Wilson himself. His attempt to 
force democratic principles on Mexicots government was to 
change the course of Mexican politics for many years. 
48 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, 
Doubleday, Doran and Company, New yo~lm, IV, 344. 
15 
.' 
CHAPTER II 
THE PRO BLJ!M OF RECOGNITION 
The United states, shortly af~.eJ: its establishment, 
.9 .7 
instituted a policy of recognition distinct from that 
practiced by Europe. This policy, novel though it was, be-
came increasingly important. 
"Recognition is the assurance given to a new state that 
it \rlll be permitted to hold its place and rank in the char-
acter of an independent political organism in the society of 
nations. ttl It is therefore of prime importance to a new 
government that it be accorded recognition. Should a state 
fail to be recognized, it 1rould have great difficulty main-
taining a position among the nations of the v~rld. Recogni-
tion itself devolves on nations other than the state con- ~ 
cerned and as such is subject to their attitudes and 
practices. 
European nations in the eighteenth century recognized 
goverIllllents on a .9:2. jure basis. Only goverIllllents which were 
I 
established on the basis of legal succession Viere recognized. 
Revolutionary goverIllllents were denied recognition in favor of 
1 Rivierts definition quoted by John Bassett Moore, Digest of 
International Law, Govt. Printing Office, Wash.D.C., 1906-;-
I, 72. -
16 
-legal claiments. This de jure policy was consistent With 
r-- . 
monarchical principles underlying European governments. 
According to monarchical theory, legal authority proceeds 
from the cro'wn and is transmitted by succession. Thus revo-
. 
lutionary governments 'would have n'5 ·:;'uthori ty. 
17 
The government of the United States was founded on an 
entirely different set of principles. The government rests 
upon the consent of the governed. Legal authority proceeds 
from the people. The recognition policy of the United States 
is consistent with these principles. Governments which rep-
resent the "vill of the people possess legal authority and 
therefore are entitled to recognition. 
George Washington, the first president of the United 
states, expressed his attitude as follows: 
•••• My politics are plain and simple. 
I think every nation has the Right 
to establish that form of govern-
ment under which it conceives. It 
shall live most happy, provided it 
infracts no right or is not dan-
gerous to others. And that no 
governments ought to interfere va th 
the internal concerns of Another, 
except for the sec~ri ty of what is 
due to themselves. 
The French Republic, in 1792, gave the United States its' 
first opportunity to express its foreign policy in regard to 
2 Letter to Marquis de Lafayette, Dec e 25, 1798. 
18 
recognition. Thomas Je~ferson instructed Grouveneur Morris, 
our minister to France: 
It accords v~th our principles 
to acknowledge any government to 
be rightfUl, which is formed by the 
"nIl of the nationi~stantially 
declared. 3 
Again, in a letter to Morris, 'Jefferson Ivrote: 
We surely cannot deny to any 
nation that right whe/eon our 
government is founded, that every-
one may govern i,tself according to 
whatever form it pleases, and change 
these forms at its ovm vdll ••• The 
'will of the nation is the only 
essential thing to be regarded. 4 
Jefferson follo~~d the logical assumption that this gover~~ent 
being established by revolution, it was rightfUl for the 
United states to acknowledge other govermnents so formed by 
the vdll of the people. 
So the de facto policy of recognition VlaS inaugurated. "" 
A government t s right to existence and recognition '\'TaS 
predicated on the fact that it existed and represented the 
popular will. Once the nation had committed itself to the use 
of the de facto policy, this policy VIas put into frequent 
~ 
practice. The republican governments of South America were 
.... 
recognized as one by one they shook off the Spanish yoke. 
3 Paul Ford, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Putnam, ,. 
4 ~~w York, 1"S95", VI, 131.-
Ibid., 143. 
19 
This vmS at first in th~ face of strong disapproval f~bm the 
Central European powers. They continued, in Europe, to follow 
the de jure policy and discouraged the formation of new 
governments, by putting dovvn insurrections in Spain (1823), 
Naples (1820), Piedmont (1821). 
Our attitude is clearly stated in a letter from Van Buren, 
then Secretary of State, to Mr. Moor~ minister to Colombia: 
Your business is solely con-
cerned with the actual government 
of the country where you are to 
reside, and you should sedulously 
endeavor, by a frank and courteous 
deportment to conciliate its esteem 
and secure its confidence. So far 
as we are concerned, that which is 
thegov~~nm~nt de facto is equally 
so ~ jure. -
The policy vms further amplified by Euchanan in 1848: 
In its intercourse vdth foreign 
nations, the government of the United 
states, has, from its origin, alvmys 
recogn~zed de facto governments. We 
recognize tEe right of all nations 
to create and re-form their political 
institutions according to their own 
will and pleasure. We do not go be-
hind the existing government to 
involve ourselves in the question 
of legitimacy. It is sufficient 
to know that a government exists 
capable of maintaining itself; and 
then its recognition on our part 
inevitably follows. o 
"' .. 
5 Moore, I, 137. 
6 Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of State, to Mr. Rush, March 31,1848 
Eventually, the European powers began to see po sst-
. 
bilities in the ~ facto policy. In 1861, Britain recognized 
the belligerency of the Confederate government. William 
Seward, Secretary of State, was disconcerted by this use of 
our recognition policy: 
Revolutions in Republican 
States ought not to be accepted 
until the people have .~dopted them 
by organic law with th! solemnities 
which v~uld seem sufficient to 
guarantee t~em stability and 
permanency. 
Had Se"ward t s interpretation been applied to cases 
involving recognition of Latin Amerioan Governments, our 
policy would have been greatly altered. It did have its 
effect though, in a few instances. The United States refused 
recogni tion to the governruent of Maximilian in Mexico, on the 
grounds that the government did not represent the vnll of the 
people and that it violated the Monroe Doctrine. .Another 
break in the traditional policy occured in 1885 in regard to 
Nicaragua which had just been vitimized by William Walker and 
his associates. Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, ''!rote to Mr. 
VJheeler: 
It appears that a band of 
foreign adventurers has invaded 
tha t happy country ••• and now 
.. " 
20 
7 Sen. Ex. Doc. 53, 30 Cong., 1 sessa Diplomatic Correspondenc 
of theUni ted States Relating to the Foreign Office, 1"Nash-
ington, D.C., 1866, 630. 
( 
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pretends to be in possession of .' 
the sovereign authority. The know-
ledge ¥re have of the proceedings 
does not authorize the President 
to recognize it as the de facto 
government of Nicaragua:-and he 
cannot hold, or permit to hold, in 
your official charact~~, any politi-
cal intercourse wi tli the persons now 
claiming to exercise thegsovereign 
authority of that State. 
Unfortunately, Mr. Vfuee1er had a1readl implied recognition and 
waS compelled to retract that implication. 
The various Mexican governments, from the monarchy of 
Iturbide through the Republican administrations up to the 
time of Maximilian, had been recognized by the United States. 
A$ has been mentioned, Maximilian's administration was not 
recognized. The fo1lo,rlng Presidents, Julrez and Lerdo de 
I 
Tejada, had been recognized. In 1876, Porfirio Diaz became 
Chief Executive. The United States~ under the admini~tration 
of President Hayes, denied him recognition for t,ro years, 
until April, 1878, because of turbulent border conditions.9 
The United states recognition policy fell under a shadow 
v,hen the hastily organized Republic of Panama waS recognized 
by Theodo~e Roosevelt in 1904. The fact that the United State 
immediately signed a treaty with the newly proclaimed republic 
8 M:r. Marcy to Mr. Wheeler, United states Minister to 
Nicaragua, November 8,1885. House Q2£. 103,34 Cong.1 sess~35 
9 Rippy, 298. 
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indicated its approval if not its cOBplicity in the e&tablish-
ment of the state. lO This incident brought about distrust of 
the Yankee Colossus. 
In February, 1904, the Hague Tribunal handed dO'wn a 
decision regarding the collection ol~foreign debts from 
Venezuela 'which had defaulted. It set dovlD. the principle 
that a nation had the right to use fOIce to collect debts from 
another nation. As the Latin American nations frequently de-
faul ted on their financial 0 bligations the Vlestern hemisphere 
could expect European intervention in the future. Rather than 
let this happen, for such an event vrould violate the spirit of 
the :Monroe Doctrine, the United states resolved to intervene 
itself and see that such debts were paid .11 This i'laS the 
famous Roosevelt corollary. nleodore Roosevelt, in a message 
to the Senate, February 15, 1905, said that if an aggrieved 
nation undertook to collect its debts it '\'JOuld be necessary 
to effect a blockade, a bombardment, or seize the customs 
houses of the defaulting nQtion. This vrould actually be 
temporary possession of the latter nation. 
The United States then becomes 
a party in interest, because under 
the Monroe Doctrine, it cannot see 
10 Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United 
States, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Hevl York,1:'90, 151. 
11 Ibid., 152. 
t 
any European pO'wer seize and perma- .' 
nently o~cupy the territory of one 
of these republics; and yet such 
seizure of territory, disguised or 
undisguised, may eventually offer 
the only way in which the power in 
question can collect any debts, un-
less there is interi'.e-rence Qn the 
part of the United ~ates.12 
23 
Thus intervention in case of financial emergency was made part 
of United Sta~es Latin American foreifn policy. 
In 1907 eight Peace Conventions between the Central 
American Republics were signed at Washington. These were 
drawn up under the good offices of the United states and 
Mexico. Though neither of these parties signed the agreements 
they were morally bound, because of their sponsorship, to live 
up to the principles set forth.13 One of these principles was 
an agreement not to recognize revolutionary governments until 
they became legalized by free elections. This vrould consti-
~ 
tute a restraining influence on the United states recognition 
policy. 
That the above principle was not adhered to may be seen 
in the following incident which occurred'during the administra 
tion of President Taft who succeeded Theodore Roosevelt. .In 
1909 President Zelaya of Nicaragua attempted to cancel a~ ... 
United states mining concession. Shortly aftervlards a 
12 Foreign Relations, 1905, 334. 
13 :semis, 161. 
{ 
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rebellion against Presi4ent Zelaya broke out. It had~he 
sympathy of the said United states mining concession,14 
Zelaya's army captured tvro citizens of the United states who 
held commissions in the revolutionary army. They were court-
, . 
.• 4'7 
martialed and executed. President Taft sent the marines to 
Nicaragua to protect American interests there. Zelaya waS 
overthrown and the succeeding gove~nt was recognized by 
the United states. Taft's intervention vms not calculated to 
inspire trust in the Latin American policy of the United 
states nor undue respect for its recognition party. 
Recognition of a foreign power is a prerogative of the 
executive branch of the government. The Constitution of the 
United states does not explicitly mention this power. It is 
inferred from the following statements in the Constitution 
relating to the powers of the President: " ••• he shall receive 
....... 
ambassadors and other public ministersH15 and " ••• he shall 
nominate and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate 
shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and con-
suls ••• ,,16 If the President does not appoint representatives 
to a foreign government nor receive ambassadors from that 
governmen~ it is not recognized according to international 
law. I? 
14 Ibid., 162. 
15 ~Constitution of the United States, Article I, section 3 
16 d., Article II;-section 2. 1? 
( 
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From the foregoing, it can be seen that the de faeto 
. 
recognition policy suffered from time to t~e according to 
the interpretation of the men who were charged with executing 
the policy. Recognition depended on two things; existence of 
. 
the government and acceptance of it·o~ the people. Prior to 
the Civil War, little attention was paid to the origin or 
nature of new governments. After the. Civil War, a little more 
caution was employed vuth regard to recognizing governments of 
unsavory origins and undesirable natures. Hovrever, political 
facts and not morality dictated the policy. By the twentieth 
century, Europe too, followed the ~ facto policy, especially 
in regard to the turbulent South American republics. 
The ~ facto policy was to undergo further changes under 
the administration of President Woodrow Wilson. He waS in-
, 
tensely serious in his assumption of official responsibilities. 
""'" He believed public morality as important as private morality. 
AS a public servant, he intended to raise the level of public 
morality. He believed that morality should govern interna-
tional principles. Several years earlier', in his book, ~ 
state, he )lad iNri tten of international law: 
It is simply the body of rules, .' . 
developed out of the common moral judgements of the race which ought 
to govern nationsSin their dealings 
'Vn th each other. ~ 
IS Vbodrow Wilson, The State, Heath and CompanY,Boston, lS99, 
629. 
( 
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The Huerta government of Mexico presented President Wi4J..son 
. 
vri th an early opportunity to put his theory into practice. 
Victoriano Huerta assUIlled power in Mexico on February 18, 
1913, following the overthrow of the constitutional govern-
. 
ment of Francisco I. Madero. Three· £ays later, Henry Lane 
Wilson, the United states .~bassador to Mexico, urged the 
government at Washington to grant iInm.:diate recognition to the 
neVI government. On February 23, Madero, then in custody of 
General Huerta, "laS shot. President Taft declined to take any 
action 'which might possibly prove embarassing to his successor. 
Philander Knox, Secretary of State, 'vvrote to President-elect 
"Vilson: 
Any formal act of recognition is to 
be avoided just at present. In the 
meantime, this government is consider-
ing the question in the light of the 
usual tests applied to such cases, 
important among which is the question 
of degree to which the population 
assents to the new regime and the 
question of disposition and ability 
to protect foreigners and their 
interests and to respond t~ all 
international obligations. 9 
It is probable that the Taft aruninistration felt that Huerta 
6 
VJOuld be recognized eventually. This is true especially in 
view of the fact that the American colony in Mexico City 
seemed to approve of him. At the moment, it ,\-vaS better to let 
19 Foreign Relations, 1913, 748. 
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things rest until the s<?andal of !vIadero t S death had d~d dovm. 
Woodrow Wilson asst.1l11ed the presidency in March, 1913. 
His VIaS the first Democratic administration since that of 
Clevelana. 20 He sounded the keynote of his forei~l policy in 
a statement given out a fevl days aft;r his inauguration. 
One of the chief objects of 
my administration v:ill be to cuI ti-
vate the friendship ~d deserve the 
confidence of our sis-e"er republics 
of Central and South America ••• 
We hold ••• that just govern-
ment rests always upon the consent 
of the governed, and that there can 
be no freedom without order based 
upon law and upon the public conscience 
and approval ••• We shall lend our 
influence of every kind to the 
realizAtion of these principles in 
fact and practice ••• We can have no 
sympathy with those who seek to 
seize the povrer of government to 
advance their ovm personal interests 
or ambition ••• 
The United States has nothing 
to seek in Central or South America 
except the lasting intere$ts of the 
peoples of the t~;\lO continents, the 
security of governments intended 
for the people and for no special 
group or interest, and the develop-
ment of personal and trade relation-
ships between the two continents 
which shall redound to the profit 
and advantage of both and inter-
fere with the rights and liberties 
of neither. .' . 
From these principles may be 
read 80 much of the future policy 
of this government ••• 21 
20 See page 1). 
21 Foreign Relations, 1913, 7. 
• 
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This message presaged m~ny things. It sounded the dedth knell 
of dollar diplomacy. It indicated that the United states 
would oppose any Latin American government which did not rep-
resent the will of the people. ThQ mention of those who 
,. 47 
"seize the pOVler of government to advance their ovm personal 
interests" seemed to be a veiled indictment of Huerta. 
The Huerta issue was pressing to. be settled. Henry Lane 
Wilson, the Ambassador appointed by the previous a~~inistra­
tion and representative of Republican policies, sent dis-
patches urging recognition. He prepared a statement advising 
recognition which would embody the folloiving terms: that 
international questions such as those regarding the Chamazel 
and the Colorado River be settled; that an international 
claims commission be appointed to deal inth affairs caused by 
the revolution; that there be a guarantee that presidential 
"'" 
elections be held; that order and peace be restored to the 
26th parallel; and finally that .American troops be allowed to 
cross the 26th parallel to establish order.22 
.Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson further supported his 
requests ~or recognition of the Huerta government on the basis 
of its legality. Huerta's government was legal. Presi~ent 
Madero and Vice· President Su;rez had resigned. Pedro 
22 Congressional Record, 63 Cong., 2 sess., Sen. Doc. 6975. 
Lascurain, the Minister ,of Foreign Affairs, then succeeded 
to the presidency as provided for u~der the constitution. He 
assumed office, appointed General Huerta Minister of the 
Interior and then resigned. Thus Huerta, as far as the 
. 
. .. ,;, 
Mexicans vrore concerned, succeeded to the presidency in a 
constitutional manner. 
President Wilson, hovrover, vms ufimpressed by" \'That he 
considered Huerta's technical pretentions to legality. He 
referred to Huerta as a usurper: f~surpations like that of 
General Huerta menace the peace and development of America as 
nothing else could. n23 According to the peace Conv"entions of 
1907, by vlhich the United States was morally bound, revolu-
tionary governments were not to be recognized until they were 
legalized by free elections. Josephus Daniels, Wilson's 
Secretary of the Navy, stated: 
Wilson and Bryan had come to 
the firm conviction that it v~uld 
be viTOng from every consideration 
to recognize the usurper. They 
vrore confident that the masses of 
l1exicans were opposed to him.24 
Wilson disapproved of Huerta's method of obtaining pO"Vler and 
I 
held him responsible for Madero's death. Priestley states: 
In spite of all his [Huerta's] 
protestations, it is recognized 
23 Forei~ Relations, 1914, 443. 
24 J'ose}! us Daniels, Wilson~, Chapel Hill, University of 
North Carolina Press, 1944, 182. 
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that the moral responsibility 
for the ~ccurence rested upon 
him. It formed the basis of 
the determination of the Demo-
cratic administration of the 
united2~tates not to recognize 
him ••• 
. 
.,' 
On the other hand, Colonel House, t.h8 President 1 s advisor, 
30 
Huntington Wilson, the Assistant Secretary of State, in charge 
of Latin American Affairs, and John Bassett Moore, Counselor 
... 
for the State Department, urged de facto recognition. 26 
The European nations, after waiting vainly for a sign 
from Washington, took the initiative themselves. Great 
Britain recognized Huerta's government vdth an autographed 
letter from the king. Sir Lionel Carden "vas named British 
Minister to Mexico. Recognition followed by S];>ain, China, 
Italy, Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Norway, Russia, Japan and 
, 
most of the Latin American countries. Sir Lionel Carden rep-
resented an active British colony in Mexico City. The lion 
of this colony was Lord Cowdray, the oil magnate. 27 He and 
his associates ardently supported the Huerta administration. 28 
still the United States refused to grant its approval to 
the Mexicitn government. The Vlorld 'tImi ted for action on the 
--------- ~ 
25 Priestley, 418. 
26 Bemis, 175. Daniels, 180. 
27 Bell, 344. 
28 Ibid., 348. 
31 
part of the Wilson admi~istration but none waS forthcdfuing. 
President Wilson waS exercizing his belief that international 
principles should be based on morality and he considered the 
Huerta government deeply immoral. 29 Wilson defended his stand 
. 
,;P ,;, 
on the grounds that the Huerta government was not constitu-
tional; that it did not represent the vdshes of the people. 
In an address to Congress, August 27,.1913, he said: 
The territory in some sort 
controlled by the provisional 
authorities at Mexico City has 
grOVID smaller, not larger. The 
prospect of the pacification of 
the country, even by arms, has 
seemed to grow more and more 
remote; and its pacification by 
the authorities at the capital 
is evidently impossible by any 
other means than force.30 
Ray Baker vvri tes that 'rNilson decided that Huerta must be 
removed: 
# 
No real peace, or order, or 
stability was possible so long as 
the control rested in the hands 
of a tyrant who was in no way 
responsible to the people and 
against whom a large portion of 
the people were in actual're-
bellion.3l 
That Huerta did not control the country, he felt, was 
.' . 
evidenced by the presence of rebel leaders such as Villa and 
29 Harley-Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policl of ~odrow 
Wilson, Johns HopkinsPress:-Ebston,'1937, 228. --
30 Address to Joint Session of Congress, August 27, 1913. 
31 Baker, rv--; 263. --
32 
Carranza in the northern, part of the country and Zapat~ in the 
south. 
The issue between Wilson and Huerta took on a personal 
aspect. Baker, Wilson's confidant, said: 
. 
V'Jhile Vlilson fo'tght on 
principles -- his conviction of 
the ultimate rightness of his 
cause added immeasurably to his 
power -- it is also trlje that 
some of his greatest struggles 
tended to become personal 
encounters ••• ln the present 
struggle it was Huerta. Huerta 
must go.3 2 
Pancho Villa had become prominent '\'lhen he took Chihuahua 
in support of Madero t s revolution in 1911. He and Madero had 
joined forces. NOi'T he and Venustiano Carranza joined forces 
against Huerta. Carranza had been governor of Coahuila. 
/ 
During the Diaz regllle he had regularly received money from 
the federal treasury to maintain local troops. By use of a"''' 
device knov,?- as the padded arr:lY list, "Thereby non-existent 
men are placed on the paYJ."o11 , Carranza netted a tidy little 
sum. 'When IvIadero came into pOiver he discontinued these pay-
ments. At the time of Huerta t s assluuption of povler, Carranza 
# 
agreed to recoenize Huerta if the army payments \'lOuld be 
resumed. When Huerta did not make these payments, Carranza 
seized 50,000 pesos from the State Banks. Huerta demanded an 
32 Ibid., 311. 
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explanation, though the banks were not under his juri~iction, 
and Carranza revolted. 33 The Carranza forces called themselves 
the Constitutionalists. ~le leader of the agrarian movement 
~ in the south VIas a peon, Emiliano Zapata • 
. 
President Wilson held a firm c1pYnion vii th regard to 
revol,utions. He believed that, IlRevolution Vias only' righteous 
when it waS necessary to establish liberty and self-government, ,. 
it had no place in a democracy; it was deeply vvrong "'hen it 
,,'las resorted to against constitutional government." 34 Evi-
dently Wilson did not see anytbing v;Tong with Carranza f s 
rebellion against Huerta whom the Mexicans considered their 
President. Wilson seemed to apply his definition to selected 
people. He believed that Madero'S revolution had been 
/ 
necessary to overthrow the tyranny of Diaz and to establish 
self-government for the people .35 He believed that :Madero 
""" had established self-government and that Huerta's seizure of 
the government vras unjust. It was unjustified because it 
overthreVI the constitutional government. He felt that 
Madero's revolution was justifiable and therefore morally 
right; th~ Huerta revolution vras unjustifiable and therefore 
morally "'.Tong. 
33 Kelley, 227-229. 
34 Notter, 228. 
35 Ibid., 228. 
"'. 
Wilson believed tha~ governments purporting to be·' 
democratic should choose their executives by elections. 36 He 
apparently did not understand that an election, in the North 
American sense o~ the term, was almost impossible in Mexico • 
. 
.• 4Y 
The people were not educated to a democratic ~orm o~ govern-
ment. No democratic elections had ever taken place. Samuel 
Flagg Bemis, authority on diplomatic r~lations, states: 
In many Latin American countries, 
not to mention the rest of the v~rld, 
governments have been republican 
only in form and letter. Once ensconced 
in constitutional authority, a govern-
ment, that is to say a strong man, 
by control of electoral machinery, 
the police and the army, can extend 
his povrer under color of the consti-
tution. Tb deny the right of revo-
lution against such a regime v~uld be 
to frustrate real self-government. 37 
34 
The usual method of ascending to the presidency was by revolu-
tion. President Wilson was judging Latin American politics by 
Anglo-American standards. 
Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson was greatly disturbed by 
the attitude of the administration. The ambassador VIas a 
Republican appointee. He was experienced in Latin .American 
# 
politics and could see no resemblance between the policy of 
the administration and the practical aspects of the case. 
He later '\vrote: 
36 Bemis, 173. 
37 Ibid., 173. 
." 
It is not an easy matter to .' 
interpret or define the attitude 
or policy of the Wilson administra-
tion toward Mexico ••• That policy 
transmitted into effect meant simply 
that no government established in 
Mexico by a revolution vrould be 
recognized by the ~e+ican govern-
ment if, according ~o~our OVID esti-
mate, the revolution were unjusti-
fied ••• the dictum amounted to a 
su~ersi~n of the sovereignity of 
Mex~co.j 
35 
.Am.bassador Wilson's attitude 'was shared by many others who 
felt that the policy of vnthholding recognition could be of no 
pos~ible benefit to either Mexico or the United states, 
especially as the other povrers had already granted recogni-
" . 
tion.39 
President Wilson believed that the British government in 
granting recognition had been influenced by cownercial 
, 
interests. This suspicion was based on the fact that Sir 
",. 
Lionel Carden, the British Ambassador, was connected with oil 
interests which had Mexican concessions. Vfilson waS 
deteroined to terminate ftdollar diplomacy.,,40 Ray Baker 
explains Wilson's attitude: 
vVhat Wilson saw ••• when the 
unexpected foreign problems con-
fronted him, was that the same 
.' 
38 Henry Lane Vfilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Ivlexico, Belgium 
and Chile, Doubleday,~age and COmpany,~ew York,1927,304. 
39 l3eiiiis, 174. 
40 Bell, 137. 
r 
forces were arrayed against him 
in the foreign field as at home. 
The very same men, He had attacked 
in his campaign the 'interlocking 
directorates' of powerful bankers 
and capitalists which controlled 
the trusts, the railroads, public 
uti Ii ties. He had q,n4.y to s cra tch 
the surface of the ~i~uation in 
Mexico and China to discover the 
same force at vrork.4l 
36 
.' 
Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson represen.ted the very faction that 
Wilson hated. The Ambassador was knovvn to be an advocate of 
"dollar diplomacy." He had been appointed by William Ho'ward 
Taft, vmo practiced the theory of "dollar diplomacy." The 
duty of the Ambassador was to protect American interests in 
Mexico. Henry Lane Wilson felt that a strong ruler in Mexico 
was better than none at all. Order was necessary to protect 
American nationals and investments. Henry Lane Wilson's 
, 
brother, former Senator John Wilson, was intimate with 
Ballinger; who was a close friend of the Guggenheims.42 The 
Guggenheims had commercial interests in Mexico. 43 The 
Ambassador 1vaS known to be a spokesman for the commercial 
interests in Mexico. He continually urged the recognition of 
the Huert~ government. He had, on at least one occasion, 
urged Madero to resign and had championed Huerta's assum1'tion' 
of power. 44 Rippy states that: 
41 Baker, IV, 60. 
1/2. Bell, 137. 
43 Gruening, 561. 
44 Priestley, 412. 
r 
I Wilson pressed his demands 
for claims upon a bankrupt govern-
ment, urged Madero to resign and 
apparently sought to terrorize him, 
by th~ menace of armed interven-
tion.45 
.,. 
37 
He felt that an orderly government,WQuld better protect United 
,.,. 4, 
states interests and investments. 
The non-recognition policy of the United States had the 
effect of retarding economic transac~ons in Mexico. The 
government itself 'was in need of a loan, which other nations 
refused to grant, pending the uncertainty of United States 
recognition. Such a loan waS necessary to finance army action 
against the insurgents in the north of the count~J. Likevrlse, 
industry was suffering from lack of fresh foreign invesi4nents. 
Advocates of recognition accused the United states of 
deliberately contributing to economic har.dship in Mexico. The 
President's supporters countered vdth the reply that if ,~ 
Huerta's government was as strong as purported to be and if it 
really represented the will of the people it would not be of 
prime importance whether it was recognized or not. 
David Houston, a member of Wilson's cabinet, vrrote: 
45 Rippy, 345. 
There was much uproar among 
certain elements of the United States 
over this policy of watchful wai t-
ing. There vrere many who were anxious 
to see Huerta recognized. They .' 
thought that if he vrare supported 
he might sustain himself, re~tore6 
order, and become a second D~az.4 
'While .American cormnercial interests might welcome a "second 
Dfaz, ff such a regime could hardly so.lve the problems of the 
,;;. .. .., 
Mexicans. 
38 
Early in May, 1913, Jonas Spreyer, a New York banker, 
called on the State Department regardlng a $10,000,000 loan to 
Mexico which was to mature in June. Mr. Spreyer feared that 
vdthout United states recognition, Huerta v~uld be unable to 
borrow the money to repay the loans; that serious trouble 
might result, the Huerta government might collapse and the 
United states v~uld have to intervene.47 
Also in May, the President received a communication rep-
resenting American business interests in~exico. Some of 
these interests were Phelps, Dodge and Company (mining), ,~ 
Greene Cananea Copper Company, the Southern Pacific Rail,rc1Y, 
and the .American Petroleum Company.48 These interests 
suggested that the United States recognize Huerta in return 
for which Huerta would agree to hold a fair election sooner 
than octo~er, the time Huerta had set for the next elections • 
.. . 
This v~uld ensure stability. Huerta was already de facto 
46 
47 
48 
David F. Houston, Ei~t Years with Wilson's Cabinet, 
Doubleday, Page and ompany, New York, 1926, I, 79. 
Baker, 349. 
Baker, IV, 253. 
authority and as such ,vas capable of carrying out the.agree-
.ent • This would put an end to the civil war which was 
destroying the country. The communication also stated that 
()ther nations 'were undermining the influence of. the United 
, . 
states in Mexico while it 'r.Lthheld'~Ycognition.49 For a 
~le, Wilson toyed ~th the idea of assenting to this plan. 
~e went so far as to draw up a recomm:ndation embodying its 
teatures, but for some reason never submitted it to his 
cabinet. 50 
39 
The question of Madero'S death was also discussed at 
~eat length. Huerta disclaimed all responsibility for 
]Madero'S death. 5l However, most of the American public felt 
"that he was implicated by the facts.5 2 Madero was shot while 
in custody of Huerta; and Huerta stood to profit most by 
, 
JMadero's death. Huerta issued a statement explaining the 
incident: 
.,,----------
•• ~aderoand Pino Su~rez ••• 
were taken to the penitentiary ••• 
When the automobiles had traversed 
about two-thirds of the way to the 
penitentiary, they were attacked 
by an armed group and the e seo rt 
descended from the machines to 
offer resistance. 
Suddenly the group grew 
1+9 Ibid IV' 246 6:0 . • , , • ~ i'E'fCT., IV; 247. ~~ P'riestley, 417. 
"/ ~., 318. 
larger and the prisoners tried .' 
to escape'. .An exchange of shots 
then took place in which one of 
the attacking party was killed, 
tyro vrere vlOuuded and both prisoners 
were killed • .?3 
40 
.AIIlbassador Wilson accepted Huerta t B.. ~~rsion of the tragedy. 54 
He pointed to a case of bloodshed in which Madero had been 
involved. 
The American .Ambassador, and the+Bri tish, Spanish, and 
German Ministers urged Madero to resign when they learned that 
his officers were disloyal. The Mexican Senate made a similar 
request. Madero ignored these and had tvlO of his officers, 
Colonels Riverol and Izquerdo, killed. 55 It may be noted that 
Madero executed men who had plotted against the constitutional 
govermaent. There is no similarity betvreen the deaths of 
Colonels Riverol and Izquerdo and the death of l:Iadero. 
In an interview with a reporter, ex-president Taft 
spoke ,"Ii th regard to the personal guilt of the Mexican 
administration: 
----------
Wilson ought to have recog-
nized Huerta in the first place. 
Of course, it wouldn't do any good 
novJ'. It's all very noble and 
... 
53 Bell~ 318. 
54 Henry Lane Vnlson, Errors vnth Reference to Mexico and 
rents Which Have Occurred"""'"TIiere (Ailrialsof the American 
55 cade'1.Y of political and Social ~cience) ,vr.:r.v ,July, 1914, 148 
~, 148. 
altruistic to say that you'won't 
shake a b~ood stained hand, but 
where in Mexico, right now, is he 
going to find any other kind of 
hand to shalce?56 
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.Ambassador Wilson pointed out that citizens of the United 
. 
States were lending aid to the revotll~tionary elements in the 
northern Mexican states. There were also radical elements in 
the United States who advocated inte~ention and vJOuld assist 
the northern states to become independent so that in time they 
could become incorporated in the United States. The Ambassador 
further stated that while such elements were in the minority, 
the fact of our 'withholding recognition gave 'weight to the 
rumor that the administration supported such a group.57 
In the HOuse of Representatives, the President met \~th 
opposition, especially, on the part of the Republican party, 
to his recognition policy. Representative Ainey, Republican 
,.... 
from Pennsylvania, attacked the new policy on the grounds that 
it departed from the traditional practice as set forth in the 
message of President Pierce to Congress, May 15, 1856: 
It is the established policy of 
the United States to recognize all 
governments \nthout questiGn of 
their source or organization, or of 
56 ChE'.rles Willis Thompson, Presidents I tve ~own ~ Two 
NelU! Presidents, lbbbs-IvIerrill Company, Indianapolis, 
19m, 245. 
57 Fore~gn Relations, 1913, 1955. 
.' 
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the means by which the governing .' 
persons obtain their power pro-
vided there by a government de 
facto accepted by the peopleof 
the country.58 
Representative Ainey charged that it was more necessary to 
. 
. ,. .. -, 
apply that rule to the Spanish A~er~can people in considera-
tion of the frequent and "not seldom anomalous changes of 
organization or administration which ~hey undergo and the 
revolutionary character of most of the changes. n59 However, 
Representative Ainey took no notice of the final clause which 
stated that the government should "be accepted by the people." 
On the other hand, it is true that little attention has been 
paid to that particular sentiment in recognizing Latin 
A~erican governments which had been set up since. This waS 
probably due to the difficulty of ascertaining public opinion 
in the Latin American nations which are composed of rural 
populations lacking adequate communications and publicity 
facilities. 
On one occasion Representative Ainey denounced Wilson's 
recognition policy in the follo\nng terms: 
I Starting 1n th a false promise 
which has led him to run counter 
to approved diplomatic precedents 
in refusing to reco~lize the de 
facto government of General Huerta 
58 Quoted in Congressional Record, 63 Cong. 2 sess. Febr. 25, 
1914, 3927. 
59 Ibid., 3927. 
and in making demands so drastic 
in character and contrary to the 
announced and longstanding policy 
of non-interference of this govern-
ment as to be in themselves under 
the law of nations acts of war, 
the President has found himself 
unsupported by a s1n~le nation 
other than the negative support 
which may be implied by the obedience 
of three South American Republics to 
the request of the United States to 
~~thhold for the pres,nt their recog-
nition of General Huerta. 60 
.' 
Another critic of Wilson's Mexican policy in the House of 
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Representatives was Representative Mondell of Wyoming, also a 
Republican. He charged the administration's foreign policy 
vr.lth lack of integrity. International policy, he said, was 
not consistent 'N1. th Mexican policy: 
We maintain the friendliest 
relations 'with a man in power in 
China ••• who recently dismissed a 
parliament. 
We have recently recognized 
as President of Peru a man who has 
not half the constitutional claim 
or right to authority that Huerta 
has in Mexico. 61 
The London Times declared: 
The only thing that seems 
certain is that neither Gen. 
Huerta nor any other president 
vdll be recognized until there 
has been a regular election. 
60 Ibid., March 25, 1914, 5494. 
61 Ibid., February 27, 1914, 4050. 
The determination of the administra-
tion in this regard is bitterly 
regretted by those who know Mexico. 62 
•.. 
Thus the policy of President Wilson remained incompre-
hensible to men who were used to dealing 'with hard facts and 
. 
not the interpretation of principl~: Nevertheless, Wilson 
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remained steadfast. How Walter Hines Page defended the policy 
to Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, is mentione 
.. 
in a letter to Wbodrow Wilson: 
I have explained to him how 
the policy that we all too easily 
have followed for a long time of 
recognizing any sort of adventurer 
in Latin America had, of course, 
simply encouraged revolutions; that 
you had found something better than 
any mere policy, namely, a principle; 
that policies change but principles 
do not. 63 
So passed the first phase of 'Nilson ~ s recognition policy 
In Mexico. Wilson had seized this opportunity to uphold ~ 
morality in international principles. Unfortunately, he 
chose to exercise his policy in'regard to a country which had 
not yet achieved democracy. The principles and institutions , 
which had formulated Wilson's political theories, Vlere alien 
~ 
to the conditions and institutions characteristic of Mexico. 
"' .. 
When President Wilson recognized the revolutionary government 
62 London Daily Times; July 14, 1913, 8. 
63 BUrton J. Henarick, Life and Letters of VIal ter' Hines Page, 
Doubleday, Page and Company, New York-;J.925, I, 186. 
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of Peru in February, 1914 his critics accused him of ~consis­
tency. However, Wilson evidently classed the situation in 
Peru on a par with that which had taken place when Madero over-
/ 
threw Diaz; for Bryan had 'tvritten him: 
It appears that the President 
of Peru was ousted, not only by an 
ambitious despot, but by members of 
the Congress, supported by the army 
against the president v"rho \'Jished to 
be the dictator. The ~oup d t etat 
met the approval of congress, judiciary, 
clergy and people. Order was restored 
under the de facto government. 64 
... . 
64 William Jennings Bryan to Woodrow Wilson, February 11, 1914, 
Baker, IV, 251. 
CHAPTER III 
AUGUST 1913-JULY 1914 
.' 
After five months, President V~~on's policy of non-
recognition had produced no tangible results. In August, 
1913, he resolved to take a more positive course of action. 
He told Ray Baker, his friend and bi~~rapher, that: 
His [Wilson's] Mexican policy 
was based upon t,ro of the most 
deeply rooted convictions of his 
life. First, his shame as an 
American over the first Mexican 
War, and his resolution that there 
should never be another such ' 
predatory enterprise'. Second, 
upon his belief in the principle 
laid d01v.n in the Virginia Bill of 
Rights, that a people has the 
right to do as they damn please 
with their ovm affairs. He 
wanted to give the Mexicans a 
chance to try. 
'It may prove,' he said, 
'that V~ shall have to go in 
finally and make peace.' He ••• 
said, that the greatest trouble 
was not wi th Mexico, but with 
people here in America who wanted 
the oil and metals in Mexico and 
were seeking intervention in order 
to get them. 1 . 
Wilson had indicated his disapproval of the Mexican War mttny 
years earlier when he referred to it as a "war of ruthless 
----------
1 Baker, IV, 74. 
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aggrandizement."2 Here he indicated his dislike of ft~edatory 
enterprise." Yet at that very moment the United states 
Marines occu:pied Nicaragua. Later in his administration, 
United states troo:ps vrould occu:py Santo Domingo, Haiti, and 
Mexico itself. 
In Nicaragua the customs were administered by a United 
States agent and marines had been there since the Taft 
'. administration. Santo Domingo was in a state of insurrection. 
Secretary of State Bryan announced, March 1913, that the 
United States vrould intervene if an unconstitutional grou:p 
should seize povrer. 3 Evidently the Wilson administration 
considered itself the sole judge of whether or not a govern-
ment was constitutional. The United States sent troops to 
Santo Domingo in 1914. Wilson's administration was also to 
. 
intervene in Haiti in 1915 after a bloody revolution against 
President Villbrun Sam, who had been recognized by the 
Euro:pean :powers but not by the United States. 4 In spite of 
Wilson's avowals to let nations settle their o,vn affairs, the 
United States intervened frequently in Latin American politics 
during hi~ administration. 
His statement that the Mexicans had a right to do as they 
----------
2 Woodrow Wilson, Division and Reunion, 1$29-1909, Longmans, 
Green and Company, New YorK;" 1912, 152. 
3 BemiS, 190. 
4 ~., 192. 
pleased in Mexico was contradicted by his action, taken that 
. 
same month, August 1913, of sending John lind to Mexico with 
proposals pertinent to reorganizing its government. 
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Wilson had a peculiar method of dealing with problems 
which were unfamiliar to him. He dia- not d~sire advice or 
guidance or even information. 5 He was himself an amateur in 
politics and knew little about foreigf affairs; yet he refUsed 
to take the advice of authorities or even listen to them. 
Henry Stoddard, a Washington journalist, stated that Wilson 
hated to listen to suggestions and gave as his reason that he 
did not want his actions nor his mind swayed by personalities.6 
Charles Thompson, another Washington journalist, 'wrote: 
No body v{ho was competent to 
tell him the truth could get his 
ear, could even get to his presence. 
It soon became a stock joke among 
people who came to Washington eager 
to lay their knowledge of Mexican 
conditions before him that the 
only vlay to get to him was to tell 
Tumulty fhis secretary1 that you 
had never been in Mexico.7 
Thompson fUrther asserts that once Wilson made up his mind to , 
something he did not want to hear any information which might 
# 
upset his decision. "Consequently he refUsed to consult the 
Ambassador to Mexico or take information from a lesser 
official. Instead he sent unofficial emissaries as 
~ Thompson, 253. 
Stoddard, 483. 
7 Thompson, 681. 
.,. . 
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inexperienced as himself. u8 
." 
He had decided to send a personal representative to 
Mexico, someone who would ~ee the situation at first hand and 
report to him. His first choice was William Bayard Hale, a 
. 
prominent journalist. ,:.;. 4, Ray Baker says of him, ft ••• a brilliant 
journalist who was, however, temperamentally unfitted for such 
a task.,,9 Hale felt that there was s~me cO!U1ection between 
Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson and General Huerta. He 
recommended that the .Ambassador be wi thdravm. lO It was a 
peculiar situation, a personal representative of the President 
criticizing and judging a duly appointed Ambassador. As a 
result the Ambassador VTaS recalled. The presence, in Mexico, 
of William Hale can hardly have been a pleasure to Ambassador 
Wilson and other accredited officials. Hale was very unpopu-
, 
lar vd th the Mexicans. "Violent denunciations [Of him] fillec;". 
the Mexican newspapers for several days.nll William Bayard 
Hale fUrther recommended that the United States intervene to 
establish order in Mexico, as it had in Cuba, Nicaragua, and 
San to Domingo. 
Vlood:z:pVl '!Ililson considered himself an advocate of non-
intervention and so rather than accede to Halels plan he·sent ' 
,8 Ibid., 681. 
9 ~r, IV; 243. 
10 Ibid., IV" 255. 
11 CEiOago Daily Tribune, August 18, 1913, 2. 
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yet another envoy to Mexico. There was no precedent f~r send-
ing personal representatives to transact state business; yet 
Wilson did not consult congress nor inform it of his plans.12 
After Wilson had been in office a short time it was 
suggested that he establish better'~e~ations with congress by 
discussing policies ,vlth them. He stated: 
I can make better headway 
by giving consideratiot. to my . 
own ideas, whipping them into 
shape, testing them out in my 
own vlay, and insuring their 
adoption by their own fairness 
and merit. I waste no time while 
I am engaged in such a work. l3 
The egotism expressed in such v~rks is undeniable. It explains 
why he did not consult congress in selecting his newest envoy 
to Mexico. The man chosen waS John Lind, former Governor of 
Iv1innesota and a Bryan man. Lind was a man viTi th no diplomatic 
experience, no familiarity with Latin American affairs, and ~ 
ability to converse in Spanish. He lacked the obvious quali-
ties necessary for his extraordinary mission. Edith 
OtShaughnessy, wife of the Mexican Charge dfaffairs, puts it , 
very aptly: Lind's "entry on the Mexican stage was certainly 
# 
abrupt, and the setting completely unfamiliar, so some very 
., .. 
natural barking of shins was the result.,,14 Charles Thompson 
12 Thompson, 261. 
13 Stoddard, 481. 
14 O'Shaughnessy, 3. 
wri tes 0 f Lind: 
A more unfit person could not 
have been sent, nor one mentally 
and constitutionally less capable 
of understanding Mexicans or treat-
ing ~dth them, than thi!5honest 
Minnesota Scandinavian. 
,10 ' • ., 
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.' 
Lind was sent vdth a set of proposals to present to 
Gen~ral Huerta. These proposals were placed in Huerta's hands 
August 14. A preface stated that th~United States could no 
longer stand inactive while conditions continued to get worse 
in Mexico; that Huerta did not represent the people; and 
finally, that Mexico was no longer in a position to fulfill 
her foreign obligations. The proposal itself stated that an 
armistice between the revolutionary parties in Mexico must be 
effected; Huerta must pledge himself not to be a candidate and 
agree to abide by the result of the elect~on.16 It did not 
explain how an election could be considered free vlhen one of """ 
the candidates was not allowed to run; and it took a great 
deal upon itself in stating that Huerta did not represent the 
will of the people. Woodrow Wilson was hardly qualified to , 
judge the unexpressed vdll of the Mexican people. 
Two d.ays later, Lind received a reply from the Mexican 
"' .. 
Foreign Minister, Gamboa. The reply was couched in diplomatic 
terms vmich pointedly revealed the lack of logic embodied in 
15 Thompson, 261. 
16 Congressional Record, 63 Cong., 1 sess., 3803. 
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the Wilsonian proposals. In answer to the avowal of fziendship 
and peace, Gamboa pointed out that the nations vrere not at war. 
It is not customary for one nation to send to another nation 
unofficial envoy avo'wing peace and then proceding to lay dovm 
. 
terms for the latter nation to foll~~ in regard to domestic 
policies. 
AnSirering the charge that Huerta did not represent the 
.. 
people, the Mexican minister pointed out that Huerta con-
trolled 18 out of 27 states, the three territories and the 
Federal District. As for fulfilling international obligations, 
no complaints had been registered by any other nation. Mexico 
was meeting all creditors. The domestic trouble affected only 
itself. An armistice, Gamboa stated, could be applied only to 
warring factions not to bandits such as were troubling Mexico. 
Gamboa also mentioned that evidently the United States re-
garded Huerta as ~ facto President since it asked him to 
exercise the prerogative of holding an election. As for 
Huerta's candidacy, it could be determined only at the polls. 
Gamboa's message said: 
Inasmuch as the government 
of the United States is willing 
to act in the most disinterested 
friendship, it will be difficult 
for it to find a more propi tuous 
opportunity than the following: 
if it 'would only vmtch that no 
material and monetary assistance 
is given to rebels who find refuge, 
conspire and provide themselves 
.' 
r 
vdth arms aRd food on the other 
side of the border; if it vrould 
demand from its minor and local 
authorities strictest observance 
of the neutrality lavm, I assure 
you, M:r. Confidential Agent, that 
the complete pacification of this 
republic '\'JOuld be ac.complished 
vnthin a relatively 'short time. 17 
.,' 
1~lson had professed his interest in abating civil strife in 
Mexico and yet much of that strife wa~ initiated vdthin the 
border of the United states where he had the pov,rer to stop 
such action. 
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On the 25th of August, Lind sent another note to Gamboa 
asking for only tvlO concessions; that an election be held, as 
previously announced, oil October '26th, in accordance with the 
consti tution and that Huerta i\TOuld not run for office. The 
note further implied that if these proposals vrere accepted it 
'\rould be made relatively easy for Mexico to obtain a much 
needed loan from the United States.18 
If Mexico acts immediately 
and favorably upon the foregoing 
suggestions, President Wilson 'will 
express to American bankers th~ 
assurances that the Government of 
the United states inll look with 
fav?r u~Qn an immediate loan to 
MexJ.co. '9 
.,. 
17 Foreign Relations, 1913, 825. 
18 George Stephenson, John Lind of Minnesota, University of 
Minnesota Press, 19~2rr.--
19 Bell, 361. 
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Wilson who had such high ideals in regard to governmeat was 
insulting the Mexicans by assuming that they would sell their 
sovereignty for a much needed loan. It is interesting to note 
that when President Wilson revealed the contents of his notes 
. 
to Mexico, before the United State'!!! tongress, he omitted to 
mention this offer of a loan.20 Tb this latest note, Gamboa 
replied by pointing out that under the constitution Huerta vres 
.. 
forbidden to run for office and furthennore that the Mexican 
government could get along without any such tainted loans. 
He re sponded : 
••• the United states of .America 
insinuates that it will recommend 
to American bankers the immediate 
extension of a loan ••• to the end 
that, moved by petty interests we 
should renounce a right which 
incontrovertably upholds us at a 
period vlhen the dig~ity of a 
nation is at stake. 
The right Gamboa spoke of was Mexico's right to choose its 
ovm government 'without interference. Wilson's proposal was 
considered a publicly offered bribe. 22 
~ 
Lind's mission had served to do nothing more than increase 
the friction between the Mexican and United States governments. 
# 
Huerta was incensed because Wilson sent dovm a man who was an· . 
unaccredited representative of the United States to do businesf 
20 Ibid., 361. 
21 l3eI!, 362. 
22 Priestley, 422. 
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vdth the Mexican govermnent, which the United states govern-
ment did not recognize as exis'ting. Ambassador Henry Lane 
Wilson wrote that John Lind was an insult to authorities in 
his demands upon Huerta to step from office. 23 He waS further 
. 
incensed by the nature of the propb~hlS Lind conveyed to him. 
Tb Huerta, these proposals eeemed to be a mere interference 
in the domestic concerns of the Mexican nation • 
• The American public mistrusted Lind because of his lack 
of qualifications and the secrecy involved in his mission. 
One of the papers wrote: 
••• Mr. Lind is an able and high-
minded man but no other government 
would dream of selecting a repre-
sentative upon grounds of a mere 
political favor or private merit ••• 24 
Meanwhile Congress was protesting the secrecy of the 
Mexican negotiations. While it 'was the Chief Executive f s 
..... 
right to deal w'ith foreign states the Senate felt that it had 
a right to be informed. The Foreign Relations Committee felt 
it should have some part in advising the President or at least 
some knowledge of his activities in regard to Mexico. Senator 
Gallinge~, Republican from New Hampshire, protested: 
I have sometimes vlondered ••• 
if it might not be well for the 
President to take the Senate into 
.. 
23 Henry Lane Wilson, Errors With Reference to Mexico, 148. 
24 Chicago Daily Tribune, Au~11, 1913, 14: 
r 
his confidence and communicate 
to this bOdy through some source 
- properly the Committee on 
Foreign Relations in executive 
session - precisely what the 
instructions2were that vrere given to Mr. Lind. ) 
Senator Fall remarked: 
·I realize as everyone else 
does, that the details of negotia-
tions of a diplomatic ~aracter 
must necessarily be kep~ from the 
public. 
It "Jill be very much better (in my opinion) to follow the advice 
of one of the men who said ••• that it 
was the duty and much the best policy 
that the President take into confi-
dence ••• the Senate of the United 
States in such m~5ters as this 
Mexican problem. 
56 
.' 
President Vfilson addressed Congress on August 27, 1913, 
ansvrering their demands for information concerning Lind's 
activities. He disclosed the instructions he had given to Lind 
,riI> 
and also stated that the proposals had been rejected. The only 
course left was to urge all Americans to leave Mexico and to 
protect those who refused to leave. In this message he first 
mentions his policy of "watchful waiting": 
# We have waited many months, 
months full of peril and anxiety, 
for the conditions there to improve, 
and they have not improved ••• the 
prospect of the pacification of the 
country, even by arms, has seemed to 
25 Congressional Record, 63 Cong., 1 sess., 3570. 
26 Ibid., 3570. 
grow more and more remote ••• It .' 
was our duty to volunteer our 
good offices -- to offer to 
assist ••• in effecting some 
arrangement which would bring 
relief and peace and set up a 
univer~ally ackn~~ledged political 
author~ty there. "/ ',,', 
,.,. .,. 
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Wilson ignored the Mexican charges that the United states was 
not enforcing the neutrality laws. He told the Congress that 
he had volunteered the good offices ot the United States. The 
fact that an unofficial envoy, a personal representative of 
the President, rather than an accredited official was sent 
seems to belie the "good offices. n His good offices seemed to 
consist in laying dovm conditions for the authorities in 
Mexico to follow. Except for the United States and a few 
satelite Latin AJnerican states, the Huerta government was the 
universally acknowledged authority in Mex~co. 
Senator Works of California criticized the President's """ 
actions as follovls: 
27 Ibid., 3803. 
Nm'l why should these proposi-
tions be made to Huerta? According 
to the position we had taken, he was 
only a private citizen of a foreign 
country \vi thout any official standing 
or authority •••• first was a demand for 
a cessation of fighting throughout 
Mexico ••• Did the President really 
think a few private citizens in Mexico 
could declare an armistice or stop 
... 
the fighting that was going on all.' 
over Mexi'co? •• The next! that a 
free election be held, ~n which all 
,~11 agree to take a part ••• the 
President was calling for an elec-
tion such as was never held in Mexico 
.nd probably never will be ••• The next 
demand, namely, that .. Huerta should 
bind himself not to'~e a candidate 
for President of his OVID country 
was nothing less than preposterous. 
What right had the President of the 
United states to insist that a 
citizen of a foreign c~untry should 
not be a candidate at a "free election" 
••• it was further demanded that all 
parties ••• should abide by the result 
of the election ••• It must have been 
a public-spirited people that would 
allow the head of a foreign nation 
to diotat~8how they should hold an 
election. 
In early October, John Lind sent word that Huerta vmS 
attempting to manipulate the coming election so he would 
~ 
remain in power. Belisario Dominguez had, delivered an anti-
58 
Huerta speech to the Mexican Senate in the latter part of ~ 
/ 
September. Shortly thereafter, Dominguez disappeared. Rumour 
reported him dead and the congress felt that the administration 
had something to do vJith his disappearance. The administration /' 
denied any knowledge of his whereabouts. October 10th, the 
# 
Mexican Chamber of Deputies passed resolutions to investigate 
... 
the mysterious disappearance of Dominguez. The following day, 
----------
28 Ibid., 63 Cong., 2 sess., 4405. 
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I the Minister of Gobernacion appeared in the Chamber o~' 
, 
Deputies and demanded reconsideration of these resolutions. 
The President of the Chamber adjourned the session, whereupon 
110 deputies were arrested and sent to the penitentiary. 29 
. 
Congress was then dissolved. Huer~a~announced that elections 
'would be held and a new Chamber of Deputies 'would assemble in 
November. TIJ,Q days later, Huerta is~ued a decree taking upon 
.. 
himself the legislative functions of Congress until the new 
Congress should be elected. 
As the date of the presidential election approached, 
Huerta attempted to rally his forces by urging them to present 
a united front against their aggressive neighbor to the north. 
In a typical Mexican election, Huerta was proclaimed President. 
The usual procedure was for a strong man to seize the govern-
, 
ment and then to hold elections which would ratify his govern-
ment. Polls were supervised by the authorities in power. 
Ballots differed for the various parties so the balloting was 
not secret. 30 Woodrow Wilson was nov, determined that 
Victoriano Huerta must go. The United states notified the 
major pow~rs of Europe and Latin America of the attitude of 
the administration and invited foreign cooperation to seeure 
Huerta's voluntary retirement. 31 
29 Forei~ Relations, 1913, 836. 
30 Gruen~ng,394. 
31 Baker, ~T, 289. 
r 
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Shortly thereafter, President Wilson sent William-' Bayard 
. 
Hale to Mexico to interviewVenustiano Carranza. This was the 
first open indication that Wilson was seeking a successor for 
General Huerta. About t~is time, Sir William Tyrell, in an 
. 
interview with President Wilson, met~loned that he could not 
see much difference among Huerta, Carranza and Villa. Wilson 
replied that Carranza v'laS the best of. the three and Villa was 
not as bad as he v~s painted.32 It was later said that 
"between the grafting governor, the bandit, and the government 
of the United States, Huerta was crushed.,,33 Carranza and 
sixty-four of his officers had signed the Plan of Guadalupe, 
March 26, 1913. This docUL1ent declared that Carranza vms. Chief 
of the Constitutionalist liI'ID.Y, and executive power vras to be 
vested in him when Mexico City was taken. Carranza promised to 
hold elections as soon as peace and order had been restored. 
Villa and Carranza had entered an agreement on July S, 1913, by 
'1Nhich Carranza ','fas aclmowledged Commander-in-Chief of the 
Constitutionalist Army. His background was superior to that 
of Francisco Villa, who had been a notorious bandit in the 
northern M~xican states. Villa, v,,-1 th his .Almyof the North 
and its alliance with Carranza acllieved for the time being an 
aspect of respectability. 
32 Ibid., 289. 
33 K'eIIey, 209. 
The United states d,id not take Idndly to the idea·'of a 
Mexican administration headed by Villa; this attitude 'I.'Tas 
61 
reflected by the press. The Philadelphia Inquirer, a Republi-
can paper, stated that to reject Huerta and accept Villa 
. ,. 4. 
tTwould be to invite the contempt of all civilized nations. n 
The New York Evening NIail, a Progressive paper, wrote: 
If Mr. Wilson suoieeds in 
substituting Villa for Huerta, he 
vall find that he has progressed 
from the f~ying pan into the fire. 
The Philadelphia Public Ledg~, an Independent organ, v~ote: 
Having refused recognition to 
Huerta on high moral grounds, are 
we now to become partners in crime 
va th a man so brutal that the City 
of Ivlexico is nanic-stricken at the 
mere threat of his advance?34 
President 'Wilson reiterated his confidence in "watchful 
waiting" in a statem.ent to Congress, December 2, 1913: 
There can be no prospect of 
peace until General Huerta has 
surrendered his usurped authority 
in Mexico; until it is understood 
on all hands, indeed that such 
pretended governments v.d.ll not be 
countenanced or dealt vvi th by the 
government of the United states. 
We are the friends of constitutional 
government in Al.l1erica; ','re are more 
than its friends, we are its 
champions ••• I'lIexico has no government. 
The attempt to maintain one at 
Mexico City has broken dO\'JIl and a 
34 Quoted in the Lite.rary Digest, May 23, 1914, 1237. 
r 
mere military despotism has been 
set up wnich has hardly more than 
the semblance of national authority ••• 
Every day his pov!er and prestige are 
crumbling and the collapse is not far 
away. Vie shall not, I believe, be 
obliged to alter our po licy of watch-
ful '\;'rai ting. 35 '. . < 
,9 .. ., 
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While the President followed the policy of n"Natchful 1'lai ting, If 
he v!as carefully deter-m.ining which of the insurgent leaders 
vvas best qualified to succeed Huerta.· His policy was not as 
negative as his speech ,\vould lead one to believe. 
Great Britain had given its support to Huerta from the 
the time of his accession to power. Relations between 
Bri tain and Mexico had been very amicable vii th Sir Lionel 
Carden, British Ambassador, making the most of Mexico's break 
wi th the United states. President Y/ilson directed Walter 
Hines Page, the American Ambassador to London, to inform,the 
British Foreign Minister that if Huerta did not retire by 
force of circumstance, it vrould be the duty of the United 
States to use less peaceful means to put him out. 36 It waS in 
November, 1913 that Sir Lionel Carden led a procession of 
diplomats in advising Huerta to yield to President Wilson's 
~ 
demands. This about face on the part of the British 
Ambassador's actions vvas caused by a directive from the 
British Office of Foreign Affairs stating that he must not 
35 congress~onal Record, 63 Cong., 2 sess., 4343. 
36 Daniels, 208. 
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interfere vnth Wilsonts,anti-Huerta policy.37 .' 
Great Britaints reversal of her Mexican policy seems to 
have been connected \nth her desire for the repeal of the 
Panama Canal tolls. American coastwise shipping was exempt 
. 
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from paying tolls. Britain contended that this was unfair. 
It was charged that the Panama Tolls Act violated the Hay-
Pauncefote Treaty of 1901. Colonel J4luse met Sir Edward Grey, 
British Foreign Minister, and intimated that if Britain ,,.iIOuld 
change its Mexican policy, Wilson vrould do his best to repeal 
the tolls exemptions. 38 The American Congress was not 
enthusiastic about repealing the exemption but Colonel House 
met members of the Senate Foreign Relations cownittee and 
explained the situation. In his ovm viIOrds: 
We decided ••• to call the Senate 
. Foreign Relations Committee ••• and 
explain the situation to them; that 
it vi01.l1d be vvell to tell them how 
important it vms at this particular 
time that our relations with Great 
Britain should be undisturbed; that 
it was better to make concessions 
in regard to Panama than lose the 
support of England, in our Mexican 
Central and South American policy.~9 
It was ne~essary for Yalson to reveal his plans to the Senate, 
othervlise it would not have repealed the Panama Canal 'lb11s 
Act. In November, Britain reversed its Mexican policy and in 
37 Charles Seymour, Intimate paters of Colonel House, Houghton 
Mifflin Company, BOston, 192 , !,202. 
38 Ibid., 194. 
Daniels 182. 
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January the United states repealed the tolls exemptio~~ 
Colonel House believed that the vvithdrav~l of British support 
caused Huerta's do¥mfall; Britain's support had been Huerta's 
strongest international asset. John Lind felt that the 
. 
differences between the contending '9f ;(ctions 'WOuld have been 
settled but for the support Huerta received from European 
governments. This support enabled hif to sustain himself.40 
Lind had by this time become an advocate of intervention. 
Secretary of State Bryan strongly opposed intervention. A 
biographer of Bryan states that Wilson and Bryan did not alway 
get along well because they both had fixed ideas. In regard 
to intervention, nIt v;as felt at the time, that had it not 
been for Bryan, vrho declared he would stand for peace until 
the bitter end, the Mexican situation might have been summar-
ily settled. n 41 However, contrary to the above assumption, 
Bryan himself states in his memoirs: 
40 Ibid., 182. 
I vms gratified to find the 
President resolutely opposed to 
intervention except as a last resort, 
and I regarded his refusal to yield 
to pressure on this subject as one of 
the most meritorius acts of his 
administration. 42 
~ 
41 Genevieve Forbes Herrick and John Origen Herrick:, The Life 
of Valliam Jennin~Bryan, George Buxton, Chicago,~5~. 
42 Wflliam Jennings an and Mary Baird Bryan, The Memoirs 
of William Jennings I?rYan, John Winston CompaiiY,'" Chicago, 
'1925, 361. 
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Joseph Tumulty, Preside~t Wilson's secretary, also sta~es that 
the President had tvJO considerations; they were: 
The fina conviction that all 
nations, both the weak and the 
po·1tlerful, have the inviolable right 
to control their in~r~ational 
affairs. 
The belief, established from 
the history of the world, that 
Mexico will never become a peaceful 
and lavl-abiding neigh~r of the 
United states until she had been 
permitted to achieve a permanent 
and basic settlement of her troubles 
without outside interference.43 
Therefore Wilson and Bryan Vlere in accord on the Mexican 
policy. They professed intervention as evil and yet their 
policy eventually led them to intervene. 
John Lind sent dispatches to Washington urging that 
Uni ted States forces occupy Tampico or even Mexico City. 
Wilson refused to consider these. He was nOVl thin...ldng of 
lifting the arms embargo. 44 Huerta was getting arms from 
43 Joseph P. Tumulty, VloodrovrWilson As I Know Him, Doubleday, ,. 
Page and Company, New York, 1921, 145-; - -. '. 
44 Ray Baker in Life and Letters of Wbodrov',r Wilson, IV, 298, 
suggests that~son O'Shaughnessy, the Charge d'affairs of 
the 'AInEJrican Embassy from the time of Henry Lane 17ilson's 
recall to the fall of Vera Cruz, had first suggested the 
repeal of the arms embargo.· This seems unlikely in trfe 
face of remarks made by Mrs. 0 t Shaughnessy in her book A 
Diplomat's Wife ~ Mexico. She disapproved of the action. 
"This act 'will not establish the rebels in Mexico City or 
anywhere else, but vnll indefinitely prolong the civil war. 
page 175. Nowhere does she mention that her husband re-
commended'or even anproved of the act. 
45 Baker, IV, 298. ~ 
46 Foreign Relations, 1914, 444. 
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Europe, while the rebels were able to smuggle only sm~l 
quanti ties across the border. 45 1/7hile 'Wilson pondered the 
idea, he was approached by a group of men representing various 
European nations. They proposed to ask Huerta to resign on 
. 
the condition that the United state1 Ugive an assura~ce of 
pacification afterwards. 46 Wilson refused. He decided to 
lift the arms embargo and let Mexico tight out its civil ~~r. 
This Etep is difficult to reconcile vath his theory of 
political morality. By this action he was made responsible 
for much of the ensuing bloodshed in Mexico. He had resolved 
to avoid direct intervention and yet the repeal of the arms 
embargo amounted to interference in a negative sense. He 
could have avoided this by aereeing to the proposal of the 
European po·wers. Evidently his determination to oust Huerta 
had reached the point where he refUsed to consider any course 
~ 
of action which was tantamount to compromise. He had opposed 
Huerta, calling him a murderer, yet by this action he was 
multiplying murderers. He had objected to Huerta taking povrer 
by force; nov; he was promoting the idea of civil strife. 
The ~s embargo was removed February 3, 1914. Even 
before that time munitions had been allov18d to go througl'r to 
Villa and Carranza. 47 John Lind was counseling direct 
47 Bemis, 177. 
, 
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finan~ial aid to the Constitutionalist forces.48 The~emoval 
of the arms embargo served to reassert Wilson's policy to the 
world. r-t affirmed his support of the Constitutionalist 
armies. And it led to immediate consequences • 
. 
,. "7 
Acts of violence shortly occurred. One of the first 
cases involved a British mining man named Benton, who was 
killed by Villa. Benton's property i~ Chihuahua had been 
confiscated. Villa announced that Benton waS shot after a 
court martial had found him guilty of making an attempt on 
Villa's life. The incident vms prolonged by Villa's refusal 
to give up the body to Benton's \,life. The British government 
issued a protest backed up by the other European nations; and 
pointed out that the responsibility rested vdth the United 
States. Edward Bell points out: 
••• the fonnidable reputation of' 
the British government for protecting 
its citizens seemed to make some 
action necessary on the part of the 
United States, which was the guardian 
of Mexico, ,and in a very special 
sense the guardian of the Constitu-
tionalists whose nominal chief "vas 
Carranza. 49 
By giving#support to the Constitutionalists Wilson stood 
behind their actions. Villa was one of the Consti tutionA1.ist . 
leaders. Britain asked that the United states investigate the 
48 O'Shaughnessy, 200. 
49 Bell, 380. 
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death. The United state,s accepted the responsi bili ty •• ' 
In March, 1914, a proposal vvas made by Oscar S. Straus of 
New York, who had a plan to send a conunission of inquiry to 
Mexico. 50 Men such as John Bassett Moore, Richard Olney, and 
. 
Judge Gray were suggested. Wilson'1-e'plied that under the 
circumstances it seemed impossible for such a commission to 
visit Mexico. Huerta and Carranza ha~ been sounded on the 
proposal and had been favorably disposed. Wilson did not act 
on the proposal. 
Gunboats vvere patrolling the coast of Mexico for the 
protection of Americans and their interests and also in 
anticipation of a possible blockade. On April 9, 1914, 
Paymaster Conn of the Dolphin and seven unarmed men landed at 
Iturbide Bridge, Tampico. While they vJere loading the tender 
"vi th supplies an officer with a squadron of Huerta f s men 
arrested them. Two of the crew were taken off the boat which 
fle'w' the United States flag. While the Americans were being 
taken through the streets they were met by a superior officer 
of Huerta's army who told the officer to take them back to the 
dock. Af~er an hour and a half they were released. General 
Zaragoza of Huerta's army said that the officer who had .' 
arrested them waS ignorant of the laws of war and was carrying 
---------
50 Baker, IV, 311. 
out instructions not to let any boat land at the dock.·' Huerta, 
himself, joined vri th the Commander in chare;e of the forces in 
eA~ressing his regret. 51 
Ac1m.iral Uayo hOi'IeVer, took it upon himself to send an 
. 
. ;p .;, 
ultimatum to the Huerta forces asking for a fonnal apology and 
assurance that the officer in charee 'would be punished. His 
demand stated that Huerta should 
••• publically hoist the lilllerican 
flag in a prominent l)osi tion on 
shore and salute it vIi th tvrenty-
one guns, vIhi ch salute 'will be 
duly returned by this ship.52 
TO this Huerta sent his expression of regret and assurance 
that the officer who had arrested the men v'Jould be punished. 
He asked that the ul timatl..1TI regarding the salute be vIi thdravm. 
General Huerta justified his officerts action on the grounds 
that Tampico "TaS under martial 1m! and orders had been issued ...... 
that no one had the right to land at Iturbide Bridge. 
The incident itself received attention entirely out of 
proportion to its actual nature. Washington tempori~ed and 
extended the time gi ven to Huerta to malce' the s alu te • This 
gave the ~erican and Mexican public time to become aware of 
the incident and to become inflamed about it. Had the ulti-
matum da~anded immediate reSDonse the issue might have failed 
51 Forei~n Relations, 1914, 451. 
52 Danie s, 186. 
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to attract so much attention. 53 A few men had been a~ested; 
released after a short period of time and the Mexican 
officials had apologized. But the United States chose to 
emphasize the incident and Inagnify the details. The A~erican 
. 
,;;. .;., 
sailors denied Imovrledge of the state of martial law in 
Tampico. The very fact that they landed unarned proves their 
lack of v"larlike intentions. It is PG~si ble that Huerta's 
officer thought the Alnericans were deliberately showing con-
tempt for Huertats declaration of martial law. But the fact 
that the .Americans VTere released after such a short time 
indicated that the event waS not considered in such a light. 
Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, felt that the 
incident was receiving undue emphasis, he said: 
I found that in the state and 
Navy Departments I '-vas alm0st alone 
in feeling that Mayo, when apologies 
Vlere promptly offered should have 
accepted them.54 
President ~~lson and the other officials backed up Mayo in his 
demand for a salute. Secretary Daniels also questioned Mayots 
right to deliver an ultimatum without first consulting his 
government.; he 'wrote: 
53 Bell, 389. 
'When the news of the arrest 
and the ultimatum for the salute 
reached the Navy Department it 
seriously disturbed me. I felt 
54 Daniels, 191. 
, 
strongly that, inasmuch as the 
admiral vias in easy reach of 
Washington by 'wireless and telegraph, 
he should not have issued the 
ultimatulU without the authority of 
the government. He acted upon the 
old time Naval practice which guided 
Perry in Japan and q..)JtJ,er Naval 
officers in foreign '!;vaters. Of 
necessity, without cable or wireless, 
a naval officer is sometimes compelled 
to act upon his judgement, being unable 
to get direction fromihe Secretary 
of the Navy. But when the wireless 
and cable enable him to get into 
quick communication vIi th his govern-
ment, there is an indisposition on 
the part of some officers to surrender 
their diplomatic decisions. There is 
still adherence to a theory that 
'strength of the Naval forces 
determines diplomatic policy. ,55 
Daniels obviously was not in sympathy with Admiral Mayots 
activity in regard to Tampico. He mentions that a precedent 
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for such action had been set first by Stephen Decatur in 
Tripoli, 1815; and later by Commodore Kearney in China, 1842~ 
and Commodore Perry in Japan, 1854. These Naval Commanders 
had conducted diplomatic negotiations vdth the aid of a strong 
show of naval force and vd thout direct or immediate instruc-
tions from their government. However, communication facili-
~ 
ties had improved vastly since then and Daniels felt he should 
have been consulted. Only the President has the authority to 
issue ultimatums. Tb do this he must have the consent of 
55 Ibid., 188. 
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Congress except in an ~ergency. 
.' 
Admiral Mayo, acting on some unknovm perogative, did not 
vdthdraw his ultimatum but insisted that the Mexican govern-
ment salute the United States flag. Huerta made some counter-
proposals none of 'vrhich was accepta1>re to the United States. 56 
He offered to salute the flag under the proviso that the 
salute be returned gun for gun. He olfered to refer the 
matter to the Hague Court. He also suggested that the Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo provided for arbitration of disputes be-
tvreen the United States and Mexico. The United States did not 
accept these proposals because their operation ,vould imply 
recognition of Huerta. 
President Wilson spoke to Congress on April 20, 1914. He 
pointed out that the incident itself VlaS not so important as 
the fact that it was one of a series of such incidents which 
~ 
shovred disrespect for the United States. He evidently did not 
feel it vms disrespectful to the Mexican nation in not recog-
nizing its government; nor in failing to observe strict 
neutrality; nor in violating Mexican laws; nor in ignoring 
the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. He cited a case in which an 
orderly from a ship at Vera Cruz had been throvm into jatl and . 
the telegram asking for his release had been held up by the 
56 Priestley, 423.' 
authorities. Wilson felt that the frequent conflicts ~uld 
inevitably lead to war. He said: 
I therefore felt it my duty 
to sustain Admiral Mayo in the 
whole of his demand and to insist 
that the flag of the.;;.Ulli ted States 
should be saluted in such a way as 
to indicate a nev., spirit on the 
part of the Huertistas. 
Mexico is torn by civil 
strife. If v!e are to .~ccept the 
tests of its OVID. constItution it 
has no government. General Huerta 
has set his povmr up in the City of 
Mexico, such as it is, ,vi thout right 
and by methods for which there can 
be no justification. Only part 
of the territory is under his 
control. If armed conflict should 
unhappily come as a result of his 
attitude of personal resentment 
to1'lard this govermnent 'VTe should 
be fighting only General Huerta 
and tho s e VJho adhere to him; and 
our object v~uld be only to restore 
to the people of the distracted 
republic the opportunity to set up 
their O'wn lmiis and o,m government. 
Our feeling for Mexico is one of 
friendship. They are entitled to 
settle their own government. I 
ask for approval to use armed forces 
to obtain from Huerta recognition 
of our dignity and rights.57 
In spite of the fact that \Jar had not been declared, 
# 
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President Wilson was ass1..U!ling authority over Congress to speak 
.,-
for the United States c> He VIaS upholding an unconstitutional 
act of one of the Admirals. He could hardly e:A.,,})ect a ne\'l 
--------.:. ... 
57 Congressional Record, 63 Cong., 2 sess., 6908. 
attitude on the part of the Huertistas after he had just 
removed the arms embargo, an action which encouraged their 
opponents. He set himself up as a judge of Mexican politics 
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'when he stated that Huerta assumed pO'wer tlViTi thout right. ft .And 
in stating that Huerta did not con.er8l all of lilexico he ignora: 
the Mexican tradition which considers the.man in authority at 
Mexico Oi ty the head of the federal g,fvernment. Wilson men-
tioned ffrestoring" to the Mexican people the right to set up 
their own government and laws. This right they had never, in 
practice, exercised. Vlilson had said they 'Vvere entitled to 
settle their ovm government, yet he himself, waS infringing 
on that right. 
President Wilson attempted to reduce the conflict to a 
personal one, "We should be fighting only General Huerta. tf 
No doubt this was to emphaSize the fact that in spite of 
demands for respect on the part of Huerta's government, Huerta 
waS by no means recognized. Thus, by his ovm. definition, the 
President of the United states was using force to obtain 
respect from an ino_ividual who waS not aci tizen nor an 
inhabitan~ of the United states. It 'was an awkvrard situation 
'which stamped Wilson as neither logical nor diplomatic. ..' 
The question of supplying armed forces to back up Admiral 
Mayots demands occassioned sharp debate in the House of Rep-
resentatives. Those opposing the administration agreed that 
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the Tampico incident vms too trivial for such drastic~easures 
Many felt that should Huerta be removed from J.)O'\,'ler a devastat-
ing civil vvar V1JOuld be carried on between the remaining 
factions. Representative Mondell of Wyoming said: 
I am persuaded ,·tilat the acts 
and attitudes of our government 
have had the effect of prolonging 
and extending the lamentable condi-
tions of appalling di~order and 
distress which prevai~ in Mexico. 58 
Most of the Congressmen felt that the honor of the United 
States must be maintained and that Huerta must show the 
respect due to his northern neighbor. The House of Represen-
tatives passed a resolution approving of use of armed force in 
obtaining Huerta t s compliance vli th the demands made by the 
Uni ted States. Naturally there 'were some extremists in the 
opposition. Senator William Borah, a member of the progressivE 
1Ning of the Republican party, stated.: 
If our flag is run up in 
Mexico it 'will never come down. 
This is the beginning of the 
march of the United States to 
the Panama Canal.,9 
Since Huerta refUsed to order a salute to the American 
flag, Adm~ral Mayo acted. On April 21, the day after the 
Presidentts message and the S~1e day Congress agreed to give 
58 Ibid., 4049. 
59 Daniels, 190. 
Y~lson permission to us~ armed force in Mexico, the ~rican 
Navy seieed the CUstoms House at Vera Cruz and the Marines 
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occupied the port. Congress also passed a joint resolution 
on April 21 disclaiming any intention of making war on the 
Mexican Republic. 60 The occupatio; tlf the :port was considered 
necessary as a German shipment of arms was said to be 
approaching. It 'waS felt, by those vjlo so wished to feel, 
that Huerta vrould use these arms against the United states. 
Much bloodshed ensued. Several American and many Mexican 
lives vrere lost. In view of the fact that Mexico and the 
United states were not at war, the action is hard to justify. 
The port was seized even before Congress had granted Wilson 
the power to use arrlled force. The power was granted after it 
had been exercised. The Constitution states that: 
The President Shall be Commander-
in-Chief of the Axmy and Navy of the 
United States, and of the militia of 
the United States when called into 
the act%al service of the United 
States. 1 
By virtue of this right he called out the armed forces in 
what he deemed an emergency measure. In spite of his frequent 
# 
avowals of non-intervention the President had intervened in 
L1exico. 
Within Mexico, the seizure of the port had the effect of 
60 Robertson, 471. 
61 The Constitution £! the United States, Fxticle II, section 
z.-
, 
77 
unifying the country. Anlericans were everywhere insul"lt'ed. 
There \rere violent demonstrations against the Anlericans in 
Tampico. 62 Even the insurrectionists disapproved. They 
considered the act an invasion of their country.63 General 
Carranza declared that he vms the a~~ority in Mexico and that 
the American demand for a salute should have been addressed 
to him. Secretary Bryan sent, Aprili2, 1914, a note to 
Carranza to explain the President's motive in trueing Vera Cruz 
Carranza replied by threatening that if the United states did 
not withdraw from Vera Cruz the Constitutionalists 'would join 
an attempt to expel theml This may have been bluster or per-
haps it was an attempt to vr.in the favor of the Mexicans by 
shovr.ing that he, Carranza, was not merely President Wilson's 
tool. Wilson can hardly have been pleased with Carranza's 
reaction. 
Things were rapidly approaching the point where the 
United States \rould be compelled to take further action. 
Fortunately, a few days later, representatives of Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile offered joint mediation. This offered 
President 4JWilson an opportunity to show his good vr.ill toward 
Latin Anlerica, a sentiment which had been cast under a cloud 
by his attitude tovrard Mexico. The ABC diplomats met, May, 
62 Bell, 349. 
63 Rippy, 352. 
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1914, at Niagara Falls, ~ntario; Canada. When 'Wilson 1iccepted 
their offer to mediate he stated that he hoped :Mexicans who 
spoke for the masses of the people VJould be consulted. 64 His 
recommendation vms of its nature difficult as most of the 
,., 4? 
people had allied themselves vri th one or another of the con-
tending factions. 
General Huerta accepted mediatioi shortly after President 
Wilson did. The first plan suggested by the mediators VTaS 
that Huerta appoint as foreign minister a man acceptable to 
Constitutionalists, neutrals and the United states; Pedro 
Lascurain was suggested. Huerta 1:vould then resign and the 
foreign minister Vloulcl then be head 0 f the provisional govern-
ment and hold an election for the Presidency. This }Jlan did 
not please President Vlilson. He seemed bent upon staying in 
hot vlater. He noV! felt that it looked too much as though the ,.., 
foreign minister vms succeeding Huerta 'with the constitutional 
right of succession 'which in turn seemed to validate Huerta f s 
leBal status. Wilson, still bound to see to it that l1exicans 
should manae;e their own affairs, sugeested. that Lascurain, a 
Huertista 4UIld a third man should take over the provisional 
governraent 1L.'Yltil elections could be held. This plan waS :not 
held in much favor by the ABC delegates. They felt that 
64 Foreign Relations, 1914, 945. 
Mexico in i ts tumultuous condition ,vas in need of a strong 
provisional governnlent and three men representing different 
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factions would tend to disagree and thereby constitute a weak 
authority. 
President Wilson for some ineiPficable reason desired 
the Carranza forces to succeed the Huertistas in the adminis-
tration of Mexico. Secretary Bryan s:nt a notice to the 
Special Commissioners: 
The object of our conference 
now is to find a method by which 
the inevitable can be accomplished 
vdthout further bloodshed. By the 
inevitable vre mean not only the 
elimination of Huerta but the comple-
tion of the revolution by the trans-
fer of political poi:V'0r from Huerta to 
those who represent the interests 
and aspirations of the people whos6e forces are noVl in the ascendancy. 5 
Wilson felt that the mediators should insist on a Constitu-
tionalist president. The Huertistas were vdlling to settle 
for a neutral president. fut 'Wilson contended that the 
Constitutionalists were dominant and a neutral man could not 
be found. 66 Wilson was anxious that the plan designated by 
the media~ors be acceptable to the Carranza forces. He kept 
urging the latter to confer with the mediators but the 
Consti tutionalists refused to cooperate in any way. They 
denied the right of other nations to impose a government upon 
65 Ibid., 1914, 506. 
66 LIterary Digest, July 4, 1914, 7. 
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1Iexico. 
Finally the mediators recommended that the opposing 
parties agree on a provisional government. Huerta vmS to 
resign and the ABC pO'l.'lerS 'would recognize the temporary 
. 
.• 47 
regime. The ABC mediation '\'Jas both a failure and a success. 
It successfully got the President of the United States out of 
an immediate difficulty. It solved t~porarily the inter-
national problem bet'VJ'een the United States and :Mexico. But 
it left a progeny of other problems. 
The plan f~iled because the opposing parties in Mexico 
refused to treat 'l.'ri th one ano ther. July 15, Huerta reSigned 
after appointing Francisco Carbajal, Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, his foreign minister, as Provisional President. 
The United States forces vrere vr.i.. thdravm from If era Cruz the 
follo'wing November. Carranza and Villa ... ·iere leading their 
armies on Mexico City from the north, Zapata from the south. 
Wilson had believed that Huerta's removal from the presidency 
'I.'}ould bring peace to Mexico. It did not. From July 15, 1914, 
until October 19, 1915, there was no reco'gnized government 
in Mexico ~or was there peace. Carranza, Villa and Zapata 
occupied Mexico City in rapid succession. During this period' 
Wilson continued to stand behind the Constitutionalists; but 
their position vms such that not even de facto recognition 
could be accorded. During this period of tunnoil Secretary of 
state Bryan vr.rote regarding the Constitutionalists: .' 
It is evident that the united 
states is the only first class povrer 
that can be expected to take the 
initiative in recognizing the new 
government ••• Every step taken by the 
Constitutionalist leaders from this 
moment on and everytliing which 
indicate the spirit in vmich they 
mean to proceed and to consumate their 
triumph must of necessity, therefore, 
~lay a very important aart in deter.min-
~ng whether it will be j;lossi ble for 
the United states to recognize the7 government now being planned for. b 
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Finally the ABC nations in conjunction vnth the United States 
extended recognition to Carranza, October 19, 1915, in hopes 
that international support of his government vrould enable him 
to restore peace. 
But bloodshed continued. In a spirit of revenge Villa 
made punitive expeditions into the United, States, slaying 
American citizens. The United States protested but nothing ~ 
v,ras done by the favored Constitutionalists. Carranza could 
not or would not stop these expeditions and Wilson was forced 
to intervene again. Joseph Tumulty, the Presidentts secretary , 
'wri tes: 
----------
67 Kelley, 240. 
With Villa carrying on his 
raids and Carranza alvmys misunder-
standing the purpose and attitude 
of our government and spurning its 
offer of helpfUl cooperation, 
difficulties of various sorts arose .' 
vdth each day, until popular opinion 
became insistent in its demand for 
vigorous action on the part of the 
American President. 68 
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Carranza's apparent indifference to_the United States demands 
. 
was part of his effort to silence hi~ "Bpponents who accused 
him of being "Wilson's man. tf Wilson sent American troops 
under General Pershing into Mexico to ~ursue Villa. Carranza 
demanded that they be withdravm. Again relations betvreen the 
United States and Mexico ¥rere strained to the breaking point. 
W'h.ile Pershing's army \vas in Mexico bands of Villa's men con-
tinued to make raids in United States territory. June 22, 1916 
there vmS a brief skirmish between the American army under 
Pershing and some Mexican troops at Carrizal. Several men 
v~re killed. Carranza and Wilson finally agreed to let a joint 
commission settle the dispute. The commission decided that 
each nation should patrol its ovm border. The United States 
insisted on adding a provision that it should have the right 
to cross the border if IvIexico failed to keep order. Carranza 
refUsed to agree to this. The commission was dissolved. 
In MaDch, 1917, the United States recognized Carranza 
de jure President of Mexico. American interest was focussed 
on the world war and the United States was anxious to be rid 
68 Tumulty, 1540 
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of hemispheric strife. 
.' 
TO cap the climax, Carranza called a Constitutional 
Convention in 1917 to get rid of the confusion. A new consti-
tution was drawn up and adopted. This constitution iNaS hardly 
. 
,1- 4? 
in line vr.i. th the damocratic principles Woodrow Vlilson expected 
Carranza to establiSh. 
. The Convention by jts First 
Article restricted the ~ights of 
the Mexican citizen to those 'which 
are granted him by this Constitu-
tion;' thereby reversing the demo-
cratic order that makes the people 
the source of rights and the consti-
tution the declaration of the 
peoples sovereignty.o9 
The constitution waS not democratic. It waS based on the 
principle that authority proceeds from the state and not from 
the people. Hilson had rid Mexico of Huerta but not of abso-
lutism. The government now made absolutism official. 
In December, 1918, Carranza went before the Mexican 
Congress and asked that certain provisions of the Constitution 
be mOdified. President Wilson had been protesting against 
the violent religious persecution taking place in Mexico. 70 
Carranza mentioned to the Congress the fact that religious 
persecution violated liberty of conscience. The Mexican ... 
Congress and the leaders of the Constitutionalist party, who 
69 Kelley, 237. 
70 Ibid., 241. 
had been leading the anti-clerical movement becrone infl~ed. 
Carranza was ousted. He fled to the coast and on May 20, 1920 
I"laS killed. 
The Constitution of 1917 had declared all subsoil deposits 
. 
,9 .7 
the property of the national government. Lands which had been 
leased to United states firms for many years and which repre-
sented heavy investments were confisca\e<l. This caused a 
certain amount of strife vrlth the United States and prevented 
the recognition of Alvaro o breg6n , the man who waS elected 
after Carranza's death, (there waS an interim. president 
Adolfo de la Huerta}. / Obregon had led the rebellion against 
Carranza. He ruled in the traditional strong-handed fashion. 
He put down rebellions and kept peace. 
In 1924 Plutarco Calles was elected President o He 
I 
carried on the anti-clerical persecutions of Obregon. He 
ruled in the dictatorial fashion. The quality of Mexico's 
presidents VIaS not improved by the elimination of Huerta. 
CHAPTER rl 
CONCLUSION 
Wilson's triumph over Huerta VIaS. inevi table; the might 
' .... , 
and unity of the United States VIaS arrayed against the 'weak-
ness 'and disunity of Mexico. HOVlever,Wilson considered his 
policy as primarily directed tovrard r~oving Huerta. Its 
essential purpose, he thought, 'was to enable Mexico to attain 
a democratic representative government. Any means tovmrd 
. 
accomplishing his primary and secondary aims were justifiable 
in his eyes. His policy did not enable Mexico to attain 
democracy; essentially then it waS a failure. 
Huerta, Wilson thought, did not represent the will of the 
people. It \\fOuld have been difficult for, a national of one 
country to detennine the ,rill of nationals of another count~ 
especially a country such as Mexico. The people of Mexico 
as a whole lacked education to the point iNhere they could not 
be said to possess a 'will in the national sense: Public 
opinion cannot be said to exist in a country such as Mexico. 
~ 
V~lson v~uld recognize Carranza because he chose to 
think that a man crying ttConsti tution" represented the "vvill of 
the people. ~~d Carranza did not represent the vall of the 
/ 
people. Jose Vasconcelos, a. Mexican, ,vri tes: 
Finally, Mr. Wilson decided 
to recognize Carranza. Vie never 
criticized Mr. Vlilson's choice of 
Carranza instead of Villa ••• what 
iNe did criticize vms that any 
recognition had been granted ••• 
One General vias recognized as a 
government, exactly as-in the old 
,'I' 41 ./ days, exactly as Porf1r10 D1az, 
one man, had been recognized for 
many years, not only as the head 
but as the body and soul of the 
Mexican nation. This dlcision of 
Mr. Wilson was for many of us one 
of the most regretable failures of 
his idealism. l 
86 
.' 
Mexico needed many reforms. These reforms would have to 
be administered by a strong government. The many warring 
factions in Mexico could only be united by the force of a 
I 
strong man. Such a man had been Diaz. Madero had not been 
such a man. Huerta had been a strong administrator able to 
keep the various factions in line until they were encouraged 
by the United States. Huerta had been eliminated because he 
did not represent popular "viII. Ho'wever, none of his successors 
/ Carranza, Obregon, Calles, or later Presidents were at all 
representative of the popular vdll. These men received less 
interference from the United States because by then Washington 
~ 
had profitted by Wilson's mistake and it could be seen that 
absolutism YlaS the only practical means of government in 
Mexico. 
1 Fred Rippy, JoseVasconcelos, and Guy Stevens, Mexico, 
University of Chicago Press, 1928, 126. 
87 
It is possible that Huerta might have accomplished a 
great many beneficial reforms in Mexico. BIt he was given no 
opportunity to do so. He stepped into power with an empty 
treasury. His hands were tied by the failure of the United 
, . 
States to recognize him and by the,1oe"tfects of non-recognition. 
These were lack of foreign func1s and encouragement of opposi-
tional political groups. Had Huerta,.obtained recognition he 
might have obtained funds. Had he obtained funds he might 
have been able to crush the insurgent forces and maintained 
peace. As it ViaS, Huerta's fall was follovled by years of civil 
strife. Chief Justice Hughes of the Supreme Court said, !lBy 
destroying the Government of Huerta, 'INe left Mexico a prey to 
the horrors of revolution. ,,2 
The period preceding Carranza's recognition was one of 
bloody turmoil. The expeditions of Villa proved Carranza did 
,'" 
not possess complete control of Mexico after his recognition. 
In this respect he vras no improvement on Huerta. Huerta's 
removal was not, as President Vlilson thought, the ans'wer to 
the pro blem of civil strife in Mexico. Instead it seemed to 
igni te a cpnflagration vrhich raged for many years. 
DovID to 1920, the country vias 
little more than a revolutionary 
2 Quoted in Red Mexico by Francis McCullagh, Brentanots Ltd., 
London, 192"8'; 56. 
shambles ••• Even after that date, .,' 
civil war 'Was always a possibility, 
being avoided more often from strong 
handed exercise of power than from 
any unwillingness of opI?osition 
groups to engage in it.) 
President Theodore Roosevelt, shortly- ,before he died, wrote: 
,. 4, 
Mexico is our Balkan Peninsula, 
and during the last five years, 
thanks largely to Mr. Wilson'~ able 
assistance, it has been reduced to 
a condition as hideous ~s that of 
the Balkan Peninsula under Turkish 
rule.4 
Wilson's Mexican policy solved no Mexican problems. 
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Nor did Wilson's policy bring democracy to the Mexican 
people. Huerta had not taken deraocracy from the Mexican people 
for they never possessed it. Nor did Carranza and his 
successors bring democracy to Mexico. The people did not 
acquire suffrage. Elections did not change in form. In 1928, 
Francis McCUllagh wrote, "Democratic Govern.'IJlent does not 01',,-. 
course exist; votes cast at Presidential elections are not 
counted.,,5 Nor did the people acquire prosperity, there was 
too much warfare going on. The material condition of the I' 
people did not change in the years follovang Huerta's 
~ 
expulsion. 
The policy of the United States in Ivlexico inspired 
3 Charles Ed'ward Chapman, ReJ?ublican Hispanic .America, 
Macmillan, New York, 1937, 234. 
4 Quoted in Red Mexico by McCullagh, 55. 
5 Ibid., 61.-
suspicion on the part of. the Latin American nations. Mexico 
itself showed no gratitude to the United states. During the 
first Tlorld War, Mexico proposed to the Latin American 
Republics that they prohi bi t the shipment of munitions to 
. 
belligerent European nations. 
• ,9 4; TIns waS not in conformity 
v.d. th the interests of the United states. 
89 
Wilson t s policy in Mexico gave, t~e rest of the 'world an 
idea of what to expect in regard to his foreign policy. Henry 
Stoddard VTri tes: 
The response from l..Iexico in 
1914 to our demand to salute our 
flag VlaS a pattern later for the 
response of both England and 
Germany to our notes of protest. 
Mexico never saluted, England 
continued to search our ships and 
Genl1any submarined more ruthlessly 
than ever. Tovrard all three 
countries vre adopted a policy of 
'watchful vrai tingt for something 
that never came--end that every-
body gut 1\lilson ImeVl vlOuld never 
come. 
In spite of Wilson t s frequent avoyrals of non-
interference he did not allo'\'! Mexico to Y,1Ork out i ts political ' 
proble.rns in its oVJn vmy. Dy his meddling he did not contri-
~ 
bute anything to the vTelfare of l.lexico or its people. Rather 
he added to the discontent and confusion already existing in 
Mexico. 
6 Stoddard, 490. 
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Woodro"v'! TJilson t s policy 1NaS no doubt sincere but 118.sed 
on emotions rather than }:novJ'ledge. He vranted to reform. Mexico 
but failed to realize that reform must come from \'.d. thin a 
country not from an outside force. Wilson was governed by 
.• 147 
idealistic theories. That his ideals were in advance of his 
OV!l1 countrymen "'!as proved by their attitude tovmrd the Leae;ue 
of Nations. Hov! could a country like Jlexico be e::1.--:pected to 
appreciate them? 
·' 
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